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Worried about misinformation this election year? Here’s what funders can do.

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August 15, 2024

Misinformation is hardly a new problem, but it often spikes around breaking news events. Racist narratives and conspiracy theories have rapidly escalated after the launch of Vice President Kamala Harris’s 2024 presidential campaign. Misinformation from across the political spectrum about the motivations behind the attempted assassination of former President Trump has also intensified.

The spread of misinformation is being acutely accelerated by political violence and the amplification of false AI-generated media. Newsrooms and journalists face staggering challenges to deliver reliable information to communities in a presidential election year — especially when these tensions are high.

The good news is we know more about the solutions today than ever before. The missing piece is the scale of resources needed to adequately respond to today’s challenges.

Philanthropy can address these challenges by combating misinformation and amplifying trustworthy information. Both actions are essential this election year and beyond to ensure communities have the necessary information to make decisions that impact their daily lives. It’s not too late to invest in this strategy.

Here are four ways that pro-democracy and journalism funders can act now:

1. Fund the organizers and experts who are mobilizing against misinformation. They are working right now to disrupt bad actors, hold Big Tech accountable, and intervene against harmful and false information campaigns targeting voters, particularly communities of color. Here are some examples of Democracy Fund grantees doing the work:

  • A coalition of media and tech advocates including Free Press and MediaJustice are running the Change the Terms campaign to hold companies accountable when their technology is used to discriminate and suppress the vote.
  • Check My Ads is following the money from ads that show up next to authoritarian messaging that seeks to undermine the election.
  • Nonpartisan researchers at Protect Democracy and Over Zero are publishing essential resources that support journalists in explaining the various threats to democracy and de-escalating hate speech and dangerous rhetoric.
  • Democracy SOS and the Center for Cooperative Media are providing crucial support for journalists to stay prepared and quickly respond to emergent issues. This includes curating resources for journalists, providing direct support to newsrooms, and boosting reporting on democratic backsliding, political violence, and misinformation in real time.

2. Fund newsrooms who are sharing trustworthy information. Newsrooms have the ideas, strategies, and motivation to meet this moment and are ready to move with more resources. In particular, newsrooms led by people of color have unparalleled reach and trust with the communities they serve — positioning them to counter misinformation and drive civic engagement. Here are some ways to find and support newsrooms:

  • Use the Center for Community Media’s Maps & Directories to find and fund diverse community media outlets.
  • Visit the INN Network Directory to find national and local independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan, and public service news organizations.
  • Learn about 12 powerful projects already underway in need of resources. The Lenfest/AP Forum on Democracy & Journalism recently highlighted these efforts to strengthen this year’s election coverage and voting integrity efforts.
  • Give to a joint effort to support newsrooms on a larger scale. The Racial Equity in Journalism Fund, NewsMatch, and Press Forward Pooled Fund all drive general operating funds to newsrooms.

3. Protect the messengers who are vulnerable to physical, digital, and legal threats. Small independent newsrooms and freelancers are especially exposed, particularly those serving communities with high levels of political polarization and voter suppression. We are already seeing authoritarian leaders attacking the media, and we anticipate this strategy will continue. To prepare for these risks, funders can proactively engage their grantees in scenario planning and be ready to quickly deploy resources if grantees are threatened.

4. Ensure newsrooms have the flexibility to adapt within an unpredictable political environment. News operations need the flexibility to plan, respond to challenges, and maintain operations. Restricted funding can lead to short-term solutions at the expense of long-term organizational health. Our funding practices can evolve to better meet their needs by offering multi-year, general operating support whenever possible, extending the timeline of grants, or reducing cohort and reporting requirements.

The need for trusted information doesn’t end on Election Day. Ultimately, elections and democracy reporting needs sustained support from philanthropy to be successful. Fully-funded democracy reporting would cover the decisions made about our voting system year-round by legislatures, courts, and local officials and track voter suppression efforts. It would allow the space to build stronger relationships with the community and the expertise to explain how national patterns impact local events. This coverage requires funders to think of democracy and elections coverage not as a seasonal activity, but as an ongoing process.


Please
reach out to learn more about specific funding gaps, needs, and opportunities that Democracy Fund has gathered from our grantees and network. 

Featured
Op-Ed

The Time to Invest in Democracy Is Now, Not November

Joe Goldman, Laleh Ispahani and Deepak Bhargava
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March 6, 2024

This op-ed was written by Democracy Fund president Joe Goldman, Open Society-U.S. executive director Laleh Ispahani, and JPB Foundation president Deepak Bhargava, about the All by April campaign, a movement of funders and donors who have pledged to move funds faster this year and support nonpartisan efforts to ensure the election process is free, fair, and representative. Learn more about the campaign at AllByApril.org and read the full op-ed at Inside Philanthropy.

Free, fair and representative elections are difficult to achieve under the best circumstances. As 2024 progresses, the good news is that one of the cornerstones of American democracy — the hundreds of nonpartisan, nonprofit organizations devoted to an inclusive, multiracial democracy — are already hard at work.

They need resources — now.

Nonprofit organizations perform essential election work in our democracy. In communities around the country, organizations help recruit poll workers, organize nonpartisan voter registration drives, combat misinformation, support local election officials and work to ensure that the diversity of our electorate is represented in our election process.

…Many donors do not realize that supporting democracy in an election year requires donations by the spring, not the summer or fall.

Read the full op-ed on InsidePhilanthropy.com.

 

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Featured

Strengthening Democracy: The Crucial Role of Election Administrators

July 18, 2024

As we head into the presidential election, the pro-democracy movement must meet the moment to strengthen our democracy and ensure equitable participation, voice, and power in communities of color. This work happens on both sides of the ballot box – by increasing voter participation and by supporting election administrators who serve our diverse electorate.

On June 26, Democracy Fund hosted a webinar that focused on the trends and needs in the election administration field, featuring Amanda Litman, Executive Director and Co-Founder of Run for Something Civics and Virginia Kase Solomón, Executive Director of Common Cause Education Fund. The conversation, facilitated by Ebony West, Senior Associate at Democracy Fund, focused on the critical issues surrounding election administration in the United States, including the challenges and opportunities administrators are facing today and strategies to strengthen and diversify election administration leadership.

Since 2020, we have experienced a high level of attrition among election administrators as a result of low compensation, inadequate funding, and a hostile work environment due to growing threats against election administrators. And, despite our country becoming increasingly diverse, many election administration positions are still largely filled by older, white Americans who may be unaware of the challenges faced by marginalized communities in gaining equitable representation and access to the vote. Finally, many states have enacted restrictive voting laws, making the voting process more difficult for people of color, young people, LGBTQ+ people, and people with disabilities. However, thanks to the efforts of our panelists, their organizations, and others like them, we’re seeing inspiring progress to confront many of the challenges facing the election administration field.

One example of Run for Something Civics’ approach is exemplified in the Arizona Pima County recorder Gabriela Casarez Kelly, a member of the Tohono O’odham Nation. Kelly successfully advocated for the reinstatement of early voting sites on the Pasquay Yankee reservation, significantly increasing accessibility and voter turnout. Her journey exemplifies the real-world impact of diversity in election administration.

We also heard about the work Common Cause Education Fund is doing to increase state-level funding for election offices so they have more resources for voter education and operations. In North Carolina, Common Cause North Carolina and Democracy North Carolina successfully advocated for increased funding to the Chatham County Board of Elections so they could hire an IT Specialist. These partnerships between election administrators and advocates are key to bolstering funding for elections so that they are accessible, secure, and responsive to voters.

The field of civil society organizations supporting election officials is small, but mighty. Organizations like Center for Tech and Civic Life, Center for Civic Design, and Public Rights Project are some of the few organizations who provide training and legal support to a field that continues to face an increasing amount of challenges including our ability to carry out a safe and fair election.

While these efforts show hope of a better, more representative democracy, this important work is at risk. The chronic challenge of underfunding in election administration has now been met with new operational challenges posed by escalating security threats. Election administrators are the last line of defense against abuse of power in our government, and their work needs our support.

Our ask is simple. Philanthropy must urgently prioritize long-term investments in the backbone of how our elections are run, election administration. Our support should support the strengthening of the workforce and the systems that make the voting process equitable. Civil society and election administrators must continue to deepen the relationship with each other to ensure we work together to solve the most urgent problems for the long-term health of our democracy.

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Featured

Listening to Our Grantees: Lessons from Our Third Grantee Perception Survey

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July 16, 2024

Last year, Democracy Fund partnered with the Center for Effective Philanthropy (CEP) to conduct our third Grantee Perception Report. This work builds on previous surveys from 2014 and 2017. We felt it was crucial to hear from our grantee partners last year as we launched refreshed program strategies as part of our new five-year organizational strategy.

Our 2023 CEP survey was open to all 250 Democracy Fund grantees with a grant active between June 2022 and June 2023. One hundred fifty grantees shared their feedback with us. We deeply appreciate the time and care they took in sharing their thoughts, and we are committed to taking their feedback to heart as we strive to be a better funding partner.

We’re sharing the key findings from the CEP report, which includes feedback from grantees of our partner organization Democracy Fund Voice.

Grantees said Democracy Fund understands and impacts their fields – providing a rating of just under 6 out of 7 on both measures. They said our team was respectful (6.83 out of 7), compassionate (6.54 out of 7), and exhibited trust in them (6.51 out of 7). They also said Democracy Fund staff embody a “strong commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion” (6.44 out of 7).

One grantee wrote: “I have worked with many foundations, donors, government agencies, and other funders during my career to date and Democracy Fund is, by far, the most compassionate, empathetic, equitable, thoughtful, flexible, and trustworthy funder I have had the good fortune to work with.”

While it is always gratifying to hear when we are doing a good job, we view this survey as a unique opportunity to understand what is working and where we can improve. Among the most important messages we heard were:

1. Grantees value our efforts to streamline our grantmaking process. Sixty-two percent of respondents reported receiving unrestricted grants and 36% reported receiving multi-year unrestricted grants – placing us at the 92nd and 89th percentile of foundations respectively. Grantees encouraged us to provide more multi-year general operating support, reinforcing the ongoing changes we’ve made to our grantmaking process and approach. After our 2017 survey, we committed to clarifying our process for prospective grantees, right-sizing our application requirements, and streamlining our reporting practices. In our 2023 survey, Democracy Fund grantees reported spending a median of 10 hours on our proposal process and 6 hours on reporting, down from 24 hours and 15 hours, respectively, in 2017. We are particularly proud that in 2023, grantees reported significantly less pressure from us to modify their organization’s priorities to create a grant proposal that was likely to receive funding: grantees placed us in the 15th percentile of all funders in CEP’s dataset related to feeling pressure from the foundation, down from the 98th percentile in 2017.

2. Our beyond-the-grant assistance (especially our support around field building and fundraising) adds significant value to our grantees’ work. Nearly two-thirds of our grantees reported receiving non-monetary assistance, reflecting our 2017 commitment to expand our non-monetary support. Grantees emphasized that Democracy Fund should continue to help new donors enter the space to increase funding for the democracy field overall, connect grantees to new funders, share its own research and learnings with the field, and convene grantees and partners to strengthen field strategies. Many grantees suggested we double down on this type of support in their narrative feedback, along with requests to more regularly bring cohorts of grantees and partners together, something Democracy Fund did much more frequently before the pandemic.

3. Many grantees highlighted their strong and trusting relationships with Democracy Fund program officers but noted a disconnect between those one-on-one relationships and our foundation-wide communications practices. Following our 2017 survey, we committed to supporting program staff as they worked to build trusting and collaborative relationships with their grantee partners. We are heartened that our grantees reported feeling more comfortable approaching us with problems, and they gave our program officers high marks for being respectful and compassionate. However, we have more work to do to provide organizational context and share timely and consistent updates with our grantees. This need was particularly pronounced as we pivoted into our new organizational strategy. Grantees felt we could have done more to engage them in our strategy development, explain the changes, and describe the implications for their organizations. This sentiment was especially strong among grantees whose grants were not being renewed, who rated their experiences with Democracy Fund less favorably across the board and highlighted areas where our communication and transparency fell short of their expectations.

We take this feedback seriously, and moving forward, we commit to:

  • Deepening our engagement with grantees by providing clearer and more consistent communications, particularly around foundation-wide strategy, as well as program-level updates. We will experiment with different approaches over the coming months, and we’re eager for feedback from our grantees about which hit the mark and where we can further improve.
  • Finding more ways to share what we are learning with our partners and develop a shared understanding of where resources can be most impactful. Learning is one of our organization’s core values, and we dedicate significant time and capacity to listening to our grantees and learning from their work. This information shapes our understanding of the problems facing democracy and helps us adapt our priorities to meet the field’s needs. We share our formal evaluations publicly, but we plan to more frequently share what we are learning from informal, ongoing reflections and to be in dialogue with our grantees about their learnings.
  • Continuing to streamline our grant application and reporting processes as we further reduce grantee time and resources spent on these activities. Since 2020, we have rolled out a streamlined renewal application, experimented with verbal reporting options, and included a “why we ask” rationale for every question on our application to ensure that the information we collect serves a clear purpose. We know how valuable our grantees’ time is, and we plan to further refine our application and reporting requirements to free up grantee capacity for other activities.

We plan to weave these commitments into our day-to-day practices over the long term as we aim to become a better funding partner. We will hold ourselves accountable to this spirit of continuous improvement by repeating the CEP survey every two to three years. We are grateful for our grantees’ feedback, and we are committed to learning and growing as we work together to build a more inclusive, multiracial democracy.

Featured
Statement

Democracy Fund Statement on Shooting at Former President Trump’s Rally

July 13, 2024

Our thoughts go out to former President Trump and all who were impacted by this horrific act of violence today. We are devastated at the loss of life and injuries and the trauma this event caused. We condemn political violence in any form.

Featured
Report

Pushed and Pulled: How Attitudes About Race and Immigration are Settling and Shifting After Trump

June 25, 2024
  • Table of Contents

ABOUT DEMOCRACY FUND
Created by eBay founder and philanthropist Pierre Omidyar, Democracy Fund is an independent and nonpartisan foundation that confronts deep-rooted challenges in American democracy while defending against new threats. Democracy Fund has invested more than $275 million in support of those working to strengthen our democracy through the pursuit of a vibrant and diverse public square, free and fair elections, effective and accountable government, and a just and inclusive society. For more information, please visit www.democracyfund.org.

ABOUT THE VOTER SURVEY
The Views of the Electorate Research (VOTER) Survey is a longitudinal survey that Democracy Fund has conducted in partnership with YouGov since December 2016. This report is based on data that include the latest wave of the VOTER Survey, which surveyed 6,000 adults (age 18 and up) online from February 22 to March 15, 2024. The VOTER Survey is distinct because it draws from a longstanding panel of voters who have been interviewed periodically since it was launched by YouGov in December 2011, including after the 2012, 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022 elections, with thousands of respondents repeatedly participating since 2011.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
John Sides is William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University. He studies political behavior in American and comparative politics. He is an author of The Bitter End: The 2020 Presidential Campaign and the Challenge to American Democracy as well as books on the 2012 and 2016 elections.

Michael Tesler is a professor of political science at University of California Irvine. He is author of Post-Racial or Most Racial? Race and Politics in the Obama Era, coauthor of Obama’s Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America, and coauthor of Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America.

Robert Griffin is the Associate Director of Research at Democracy Fund. Prior, Griffin was the Research Director for the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, the Associate Director of Research at the Public Religion Research Institute and the Director of Quantitative Analysis at the Center for American Progress.

 

Main Takeaways

  • Between 2011 and 2020 there was dramatic shift in attitudes on racial inequality and discrimination as well as immigration. The attitudes of Democrats and independents became notably more liberal during this period.
  • Since 2020, attitudes on racial inequality and discrimination have been relatively stable. Any changes mostly reflect modest declines in liberal attitudes among Democrats and modest increases in these attitudes among Republicans. The parties are a bit less polarized in 2024 than in 2020.
  • The initial changes in attitudes about racial inequality and discrimination resulted from Trump’s polarizing presidency and the salience of racial justice issues, especially after George Floyd’s murder. The trends since 2021 stem from declining media attention to racial justice issues and thus less priority on these issues among voters. Polling also shows that Biden is a less racially polarizing figure than Trump.
  • On immigration, there has been a rightward shift in both parties and especially among Republicans. This reflects the increasing media attention to immigration and the public salience of the issue, particularly for Republicans. Moreover, the bipartisan elite consensus on the need for more border security has helped produce parallel shifts among Republican and Democrats.
  • Taken together, these trends suggest that race and immigration might have a new “thermostatic” dynamic, with attitudes shifting in the opposite direction of the party in the White House.

 

Introduction

As president, Donald Trump’s political agenda and rhetoric often centered on polarizing ideas about civil rights, crime, and immigration. He referred to immigrants coming from “shithole countries,” defended Confederate statues, and pursued controversial policies such as separating immigrant children from their families when they were detained crossing the U.S.-Mexico border.

When Joe Biden took office in January 2021, he seemed poised to change the subject. His agenda was more centered on other priorities, such as the economic recovery from the pandemic. But Biden also inherited party coalitions that increasingly differ in their views of racial equality, immigration, and related issues. He talked about these issues very early in his presidency and reversed some of Trump’s policies.1 However, his desire to chart a different course on immigration faced significant challenges, as record numbers of immigrants entered the U.S. from Mexico. In a January 2024 statement, he called the situation at the border “broken.”2

In this report, we investigate how Americans’ attitudes about race and immigration evolved over Trump’s presidency and in the first three years of Biden’s term. We draw on several different surveys, but especially the Democracy Fund VOTER Survey (Views of the Electorate Research Survey), which has interviewed a sample of Americans multiple times since late 2011, augmenting that sample with new respondents along the way. The most recent survey is from March 2024. Together, the VOTER Survey and other surveys help us identify trends in these attitudes.

We find that views of racial inequality and discrimination changed dramatically under Trump, with Democrats in particular becoming more likely to take the “liberal” view, which attributes racial inequality to structural forces as opposed to individuals’ own failings. After Trump’s departure, those attitudes have remained relatively stable. There have been very modest declines in liberal attitudes among Democrats and an even more modest increase in liberal attitudes among Republicans. Other surveys and survey questions show a similar pattern. Thus, Democratic and Republican attitudes have converged slightly after several years of divergence.

We argue that the trends from 2016 to 2020 reflect the polarizing effect of Trump, particularly in driving Democrats to the left, combined with the renewed salience of racial justice issues after the murder of George Floyd. Beginning in the fall of 2020, racial justice issues faded from the news as the protests abated. As of 2024, voters see these issues as less important than they did four years ago. Moreover, Biden has emerged as a president who is less polarizing on these issues. These factors may have helped create this slight convergence between the parties.

The story of immigration attitudes is different. There was the same leftward shift under Trump, again mostly among Democrats. But under Biden, several measures of these attitudes show a rightward shift — with less support for a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants and more support for decreasing immigration, deporting undocumented immigrants, and building a U.S.-Mexico border wall. Some of these measures show roughly similar shifts among Democrats and Republicans, and others show a much larger shift among Republicans.

We attribute these trends to two factors. One is the increase in border crossings and the resulting increase in the salience of the issue. Immigration has become more important in news coverage and in voters’ minds even as racial equality has become less important. The other is, once again, the elite leadership of public opinion. In particular, under Biden there has been some degree of elite bipartisan consensus on the need for increased border security, which may have helped move both Democratic and Republican voters in a conservative direction.

Taken together, these trends in opinions and their likely causes complicate the common narrative that the country experienced a “Great Awokening” followed by a decline from what commentators have called “peak wokeness.” The likelier story — and the more probable future for American politics — is that issues like race and immigration have become “thermostatic,” with public opinion moving against the president’s rhetoric, priorities, and policies. Thus, we should expect opinions about these issues to shift in different ideological directions in response to events, policy, and elite rhetoric, rather than rising to a single liberal peak and then falling.

The reason to expect thermostatic politics is that the two parties continue to differ on why racial inequality arises, whether racial discrimination is a problem, and how to approach both legal and undocumented immigration. Democrats and Republicans are still significantly more polarized than they were before Trump became president. Thus, we should expect Democratic and Republican administrations to govern differently on these issues, pushing policy in their preferred direction, even as some Americans move in the opposite direction.

Views of Racial Inequality and Discrimination

To measure views of racial inequality and discrimination, we focus on three main topics. The first is how citizens explain racial inequalities involving Black Americans, and specifically whether they attribute it more to structural forces or to the individual characteristics of Black people. The second is how much discrimination citizens believe that different racial and ethnic groups face. The third is how much different racial and ethnic groups are advantaged or disadvantaged because of their race.

These topics that speak to whether Americans even see patterns of racial discrimination and disadvantage to begin with, which groups they believe are most affected, and what they believe creates any disadvantages.

To measure attributions about racial inequality, we draw on a long-standing battery of questions that ask respondents whether they agree or disagree with the following four statements:

  • Over the past few years, Black people have gotten less than they deserve.
  • Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Black people should do the same without any special favors.
  • It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Black people would only try harder they could be just as well off as white people.
  • Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Black people to work their way out of the lower class.3

As we and others have documented, there were substantial changes in these attitudes between 2011 and 2020, as Democrats and independents became more likely to attribute racial inequality to structural rather than individual-level factors. These trends are almost entirely due to partisans updating their attitudes about race, not to people changing their partisanship.4 Other research has demonstrated that these changes were genuine and not due to survey respondents’ cloaking their real feelings behind socially desirable responses.5

In the 2022 and 2024 VOTER Surveys, overall opinion was similar to what it was after the 2020 election (Figure 1). The number of Americans who disagreed that Black people should overcome prejudice without special favors was 37 percent in the November 2020 survey and 33 percent in March 2024. The fraction of Americans who disagreed that Black people could be just as well off as white people was 45 percent in 2020 and 44 percent in 2024. A similar fraction agreed that generations of discrimination and slavery still prevent Black people from making economic progress, and this fraction also remained relatively stable between 2020 and 2024. There was a small drop in the percentage of Americans who agreed that Black people have gotten less than they deserve — from 45 percent in 2020 to 40 percent in 2024.

Four line graphs illustrate respective responses to four questions about racial inequality by all Americans, Democrats, independents, and Republicans over time. Democrats consistently express the most liberal attitudes, but views began to converge after 2020.

The overall stability in these attitudes conceals a modest partisan convergence. In 2024, a slightly higher percentage of Republicans expressed more liberal attitudes on these indicators, although most Republicans did not. Meanwhile, liberal attitudes became a little bit less prevalent among Democrats. For example, relative to 2020, fewer Democrats in 2024 agreed that Black people have gotten less than they deserve (a drop from 73 percent to 66 percent) and agreed that slavery and discrimination have prevented Black people from making economic progress (a drop from 77 percent to 73 percent).

These changes occurred mainly among white, Latino, and Asian Democrats (Figure 2).6 Notably, even with these recent shifts, Democrats in all major racial and ethnic groups are still more likely than they were 10 years ago to give responses consistent with structural explanations for racial inequality. And on most indicators, white, Latino, and Asian Democrats have attitudes more similar to those of Black Democrats than they did in late 2011.

Democrats of different races over time. Separate lines represent Black, white, Latino, and Asian Democrats. All lines move upward to indicate increases in liberal attitudes during the span between 2012 and 2024. This and some movement in a less liberal direction by some in 2020 have resulted in greater convergence of attitudes on this topic.

The VOTER Survey has also tracked Americans’ perceptions of discrimination over a shorter timespan (2020, 2022, and 2024) — specifically, how much discrimination people believe a given racial or ethnic group is experiencing. Overall, fewer Americans now say that Black and Latino people face high levels of discrimination (Figure 3). The fraction saying that Black people face “a lot” or “a great deal” of discrimination declined from 50 percent in September 2020 to 44 percent in March 2024. In addition, fewer Americans say that Latino people face high levels of discrimination (a shift from 37 percent to 32 percent). By contrast, the number of Americans who said that Asian people face discrimination increased from 23 percent to 31 percent.

Four line graphs illustrate changing responses to the question of how much discrimination there is in the United States against white, Black, Latino, and Asian people, respectively. Separate lines represent respondent groups of all Americans, Democrats, independents and Republicans.

In the first two cases, these drops were driven mainly by shifts among Democrats and independents. Between 2020 and 2024, there was a 12-point drop in the percentage of Democrats who said Black people face high levels of discrimination.7 There was a 4-point drop among independents. If anything, Republicans became slightly more likely to say that Black, Latino, and Asian people faced serious discrimination. As a result, there is less party polarization in perceptions of discrimination against these groups in 2024 than in the two prior surveys.

However, perceptions of discrimination against white people showed a different pattern: There was an increase in perceptions of discrimination — but mostly among Republicans. The fraction of Republicans who said that white people faced high levels of discrimination increased from 23 percent to 39 percent. In contrast to other trends identified in this section, this created more polarization between the parties, not less.

There was also an increase in the percentage of Republicans who appeared to believe that white people face more discrimination than do Black people or Latino people (Figure 4). For example, 29 percent of Republicans said that white people faced more discrimination than Black people in 2020. By 2024, that increased to 44 percent. Fewer Republicans (25 percent) said that Black people experience more discrimination. By comparison, in 2024 the vast majority of Democrats (82 percent) said that Black people experience more discrimination. The trends for beliefs about white and Latino discrimination are nearly identical among all Americans and partisan groups over this time period.

Stacked horizontal bar chart shows responses by all Americans, Democrats, independents and Republicans to the question of whether white or Black people face more discrimination or whether they face equal discrimination. The increase in all Americans saying white people face more discrimination is driven largely by the increase in Republicans expressing this perception.

This fits a general pattern: Democrats tend to believe that historically marginalized groups — such as Black people, women, Jewish people, and Muslim people — experience more discrimination than historically advantaged groups such as white people, men, and Christians. Republicans tend to see these groups as facing similar levels of discrimination or, as the example above illustrates, that the historically advantaged groups actually face more discrimination.8

The VOTER Survey also included several questions relating to perceptions of racial opportunities and advantages. These were asked in 2020, 2022, and 2024. Similar to the trends shown in Figures 1 and 2, there has been stability in these attitudes and signs that attitudes are a bit less liberal than they were two years ago (Table 1).

In 2020 and 2024, the same fraction of Americans (51 percent) said that racial minority groups have mostly fair opportunities to advance. There were some small shifts in other indicators, ranging from 0 to 7 percentage points, with any changes moving in the same direction: Fewer Americans agreed that society systematically advantages white people (54 percent vs. 50 percent) or, phrased differently, that white people enjoy social and economic privileges because of their race (54 percent vs. 50 percent). Americans were also less likely to agree that white people should feel guilty about racial inequality (33 percent vs. 26 percent) or that increased opportunities for Black people have improved the country’s quality of life (63 percent vs. 58 percent).

On several of these questions, the partisan gaps, although still substantial, were slightly smaller in 2024 than in 2020, mirroring the modest convergence evident in Figures 1 and 3. But Democrats and Republicans remain far apart.

Large table shows the percent of agreement with six statements, respectively, about racial opportunity and advantage. Table notes responses in 2020 and 2024, and whether there is a positive or negative percentage point change. Responses are sorted by all Americans, Democrats, independents, and Republicans, as well as white, Black, Latino, and Asian American and Pacific Islander respondents.

Similar findings emerged in the Cooperative Election Study, a different survey that was also conducted in 2020 and 2022 (Table 2). In response to questions about whether white people have an advantage and whether racial problems are rare, there were also small shifts. More often than not, any shifts meant that slightly fewer Americans expressed concern about white advantage or racial problems. There were, likewise, parallel trends among most racial groups and modest convergence between Democrats and Republicans.

At the same time, large differences between Democrats and Republicans remain. For example, in 2022, 84 percent of Democrats but only 20 percent of Republicans agreed that white people had advantages because of the color of their skin.

Large table shows the percent of agreement with five statements, respectively, about racial opportunity and advantage. Table notes responses in 2020 and 2022, and whether there is a positive or negative percentage point change. Responses to two of the statements are grouped by all Americans, Democrats, independents, and Republicans, as well as white, Black, Latino, and Asian American and Pacific Islander respondents. Three of the statements do not feature responses by white or party-specific survey takers.

The Cooperative Election Study also asked three questions only of respondents who did not identify as white. These questions asked about white people’s views of racial discrimination and racial advantages. In both years, majorities or near-majorities of Black, Latino, and Asian-American respondents expressed resentment about white people’s denial of racial discrimination, agreed that white people get away with offenses that Black people cannot, and agreed that white people do not try hard to understand the problems Black people face. Unsurprisingly, these sentiments were particularly prevalent among Black respondents. But, in line with the trends in Table 1, such sentiments were a bit less prevalent in 2022 than 2020 — and this was true among all three of these racial groups.

Changing Messages About Race

What accounts for these trends in attitudes about racial inequality and discrimination? Any answer to this question must help explain both the growing partisan differences under Trump, largely driven by Democratic voters moving in a racially progressive direction, and the modest shifts under Biden’s presidency, which reflect less progressive views among Democratic voters and more progressive views among Republican voters. It is a pattern of rapid partisan divergence followed by a small convergence.

These trends derive from a profound change in the messages that voters heard from political leaders and activists. Between 2015 and 2020, voters encountered Trump’s hostile statements about racial and ethnic minorities as well as a highly visible social movement pushing for racial justice after the murder of George Floyd — a movement that Trump attacked vociferously. But the public presence of this movement faded in late 2020, and Trump then lost to Biden, who has not been as polarizing a figure on issues related to race.

Starting in 2015 during his presidential campaign and then continuing during his presidency, Trump’s rhetoric had the counterintuitive effect of pushing public opinion about racial inequality and discrimination to the left, especially among Democrats. Trump’s positions and statements on race, immigration, and Muslims created an incongruity for Democrats who disliked Trump but were otherwise more moderate or conservative on these issues.9 The easiest way for those Democrats to resolve this incongruity was to shift their positions away from Trump’s — a phenomenon that is common for people who find themselves in the uncomfortable position of having previously supported some of the opposing party’s mostly salient policies.10

And that is precisely what Democrats did. White Americans’ feelings about Trump in 2016 were strongly associated with subsequent changes in their views of racial inequality as well as their feelings about the Black Lives Matter movement and police. In particular, the less favorably white Americans felt toward Trump in 2016, the more their attitudes shifted in a liberal direction between 2016 and 2020.

This divergence between Democrats and Republicans was only magnified during the racial justice protests after George Floyd was murdered on May 25, 2020. Initially, Americans of all partisan persuasions shifted toward a more sympathetic view of Black Americans and a less favorable view of the police. But those effects waned as the protests moved out of the news. By early 2021, any impact of these protests was visible mainly among Democrats, pushing them toward a more progressive view. As a result, Democrats and Republicans ended up further apart than they were before the protests.11

This began to change in 2021. Without a prominent mobilization around racial justice, the topics that were frequently in the news after Floyd’s murder — references to Floyd himself, to Black Lives Matter, to racism — never returned to their peak during the summer of 2020 except for a temporary spike when Floyd’s killer, Derek Chauvin, was convicted in April 2021 (Figure 5).12

Stacked vertical bar chart illustrates coverage of key racial justice topics by Fox, CNN, and MSNBC each month over a period from 2010 into 2024 with two significant spikes occurring between 2020 and 2022.

Alongside this decline in news attention, fewer voters perceived racial equality and police reform as important issues (Figure 6).13 In the 2024 VOTER Survey, 43 percent of respondents said racial equality was a very important issue, down from 48 percent in 2020. This decrease occurred mostly among Democrats (9-point drop) and independents (3-point drop). The importance of police reform dropped as well.14 In both cases, these declines among Democrats were evident in every major racial and ethnic group.

Three line graphs show changes in the percent of survey respondents who say racial equity, police reform, and immigration, respectively, are important issues. Separate lines represent the responses of all Americans and those who identify as Democrats, Republicans, and independents.

The change brought about by Biden’s victory also shaped the messages voters encountered. With Trump out of office, the backlash against his presidency became less of a factor in public opinion about racial inequality and discrimination than it was back in 2020. This helps to explain why Democratic views have become a little bit less liberal.15

Biden himself has also been a less polarizing figure on these issues. He did not embrace the most progressive positions in his party after Floyd’s murder, rejecting calls to “defund the police.” And although his administration’s policymaking represents a clear departure from Trump’s, Americans do not perceive Biden as favoring one racial group over another to the extent that they did Trump when he was president.

For example, nearly half (49 percent) of respondents in the September 2020 VOTER Survey said that the Trump administration favored white people over Black people. At that point, almost no one said his presidency favored Black people over white people. In the November 2022 VOTER survey, conducted almost two years into Biden’s presidency, just 27 percent of Americans thought Biden favored Black people over white people while 10 percent thought the opposite. Overall, Americans perceived less racial favoritism from Biden than they did from Trump.

More recent polling shows the same difference in perceptions. An October 30–November 3, 2023, CBS News poll asked “If Donald Trump wins in 2024, do you think his policies in a second term would try to put the interests of white people over racial minorities, racial minorities over white people, or treat their interests the same way?” Almost half (48 percent) said “white people over minorities,” and only 3 percent said “racial minorities over white people.” When asked the same question about Biden, 39 percent said “racial minorities over white people” and 18 percent said “white people over racial minorities.”16

Perceptions of racial favoritism are also less polarized by party when Americans think about Biden compared to Trump. When this 2023 CBS News poll asked about Trump, 80 percent of Democrats said he would favor white people, while only 14 percent of Republicans thought that. Almost all Republicans (82 percent) said Trump would treat white people and racial minorities the same way.

When asked about Biden, Democrats and Republicans were divided, but not as starkly. Among Democrats, 67 percent said Biden would treat white people and racial minorities the same way, while 20 percent said he would favor white people and 13% said he would favor racial minorities. Most Republicans (63 percent) said Biden would favor racial minorities but over a third said white people (17 percent) or both groups equally (20 percent).

Thus, Biden’s policymaking and rhetoric on issues related to race have not inspired the same polarized perceptions as Trump’s. This may have helped create the modest partisan convergence in racial attitudes between 2020–24.

Views of Immigration

Trends in attitudes about immigration are similar to trends in attitudes about racial inequality and discrimination in some respects, but there are also important differences. There were increasingly liberal immigration attitudes during the Trump presidency — driven in large part by shifts among Democrats. These attitudes have also shifted in the conservative direction since 2020.

But unlike with attitudes about racial inequality and discrimination, this conservative shift is visible in both parties and especially among Republicans. Thus, the modest partisan convergence in racial attitudes does not necessarily emerge in immigration attitudes: Both parties are moving in the same direction, and the larger shift among Republicans on certain survey questions has created even more polarization.

The VOTER Survey has asked three questions consistently since late 2011: whether to create a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, whether undocumented immigrants contribute to society or are a drain on society, and whether it should be easier or harder to immigrate to the U.S. The first two of those questions show trends similar to the trends in attitudes about racial inequality and discrimination: a sharp increase in pro-immigrant views through 2020, particularly among Democrats, and then a smaller decrease in those views between 2020 and 2024 (Figure 7). The question about making it easier or harder to immigrate shows the same increase among Democrats during the Trump administration, but a smaller decrease afterward. Interestingly, the percentage of Republicans who wanted to make it easier to immigrate actually increased by 8 points between 2020 and 2024.

Three line graphs show changes in whether voters favor a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, see undocumented immigrants as contributors to American society, and want to make it easier to immigrate to the United States, respectively. Separate lines represent the responses of all Americans and those who identify as Democrats, Republicans, independents.

But other survey questions show a somewhat different pattern, with sharper conservative shifts among Republicans than Democrats. This may reflect the fact that Republican attitudes are already quite conservative on the three immigration questions in the VOTER Survey; simply put, there is not much room for them to shift further to the right. On other questions, by contrast, there is more variation within the GOP.

One example has to do with preferred levels of immigration to the U.S. Since 1965, the Gallup polling organization has asked whether people want to increase or decrease immigration to the country or keep it at its present level. Partisan differences on this question emerged gradually beginning in the early 2000s and then accelerated during the Trump administration. Again, this was largely due to a liberal shift among Democrats (Figure 8).17

However, since Biden was inaugurated, there has been a dramatic change in Republican attitudes. The percentage of Republicans who want to decrease immigration rose by 25 percentage points in two years — from 48 percent to 73 percent, as of June 2023 (Figure 8). In the most recent survey, more Republicans wanted to decrease immigration than at any point in Gallup’s polling for the past 60 years. Democrats have shifted in the same direction, but by less.18

A different way of asking about a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants also shows a partisan asymmetry. In surveys by the firm Civiqs since Biden’s election, there has been a 17-point increase in the percentage of Republicans who prefer to “deport immigrants living here illegally” instead of giving them a “path to citizenship.” As of December 2023, 81 percent prefer deportation. Meanwhile, 82 percent of Democrats prefer a path to citizenship when the question is framed that way, which represents a 7-point drop since Election Day 2020.19

Consistent with this increasingly restrictive sentiment toward undocumented immigrants, public support for the U.S.-Mexico border wall has also increased.20

Two area charts show changes in preferences for increasing, maintaining, or decreasing levels of immigration to the United States. Top chart reflects Democrat respondents and bottom chart reflects Republican respondents.

The Evolution of Immigration Politics

We have shown some de-polarization on attitudes about racial inequality and discrimination since 2020 — with Democrats moving a little to the right and Republicans a little to the left — but more polarization on immigration attitudes, with both parties shifting to the right but Republicans shifting further. The differences in these two sets of trends means that underlying factors behind the immigration trends are not exactly the same as those behind trends in attitudes about race.

One common factor is the reaction to Trump’s rhetoric and policymaking. Trump staked out quite conservative positions on these issues during his 2016 campaign and then sought to implement them. His immigration policymaking included efforts to restrict immigration and punish undocumented immigrants, including the infamous program of family separation at the U.S.-Mexico border. Thus, Democratic voters who were initially less liberal on immigration policy shifted to the left for the same reason they did on racial issues: Their aversion to Trump led them to move their attitudes in the opposite direction.

Two things have changed under Biden. First, there has been an increase in media attention to immigration since Biden took office. For example, the number of mentions of the word “border” on major cable news networks has been consistently higher under Biden’s presidency than during Obama’s and Trump’s (Figure 9). This reflects both the increase in border crossings during Biden’s presidency and the agenda of more conservative outlets. Most of the monthly mentions of the border on these cable networks are on Fox News.

Stacked vertical bar chart illustrates coverage about the U.S.-Mexico border by Fox, CNN, and MSNBC each month over a period from 2010 into 2024, with Fox representing the majority of the increase.

These factors have combined to increase the salience of immigration to American voters — particularly Republicans.21 In the 2020 VOTER Survey, 47 percent of Americans said that immigration was “very important.” This increased to 54 percent in 2024 (see Figure 6). Thus, over these four years, fewer Americans saw racial equality as an important issue but more saw immigration as important.

The second change under Biden concerned his policymaking and rhetoric. In some ways, Biden broke with Trump. For example, he canceled Trump’s executive actions that restricted immigration from certain Muslim-majority countries and reversed a Trump policy that cracked down on cities who would not cooperate with federal immigration agents.

At the same time, Democratic and Republican leaders have offered broadly similar messages about the need for more border enforcement. Of course, Republicans have harshly criticized Biden’s handling of immigration and called for a raft of new security measures. Republican politicians, especially Texas Governor Greg Abbott, have pursued their own enforcement policies.

But many Democratic leaders have also expressed concerns about the border. One example is local Democratic leaders in New York City and elsewhere who have faced influxes of immigrants and the need to provide services for them. Biden himself endorsed a bipartisan bill that would have provided for stricter enforcement, although it was ultimately killed by Republicans who seemed unwilling to give the Biden administration a legislative victory in an election year. Biden then pursued action on his own in June 2024, announcing restrictions on immigrants seeking asylum at the U.S.-Mexico border.

This combination of events, news coverage, and relative partisan consensus on border security helps explain why Democrats and Republicans have moved toward more conservative positions. With some degree of agreement between prominent Democrats and Republicans, Democratic and Republican voters should trend in the same direction, as they generally have.

However, Republican leaders and the conservative news media have focused more on immigration than Democratic leaders, which may have led to a stronger reaction among Republican voters. In addition to the disproportionate amount of coverage coming from conservative outlets, data on how members of Congress communicate with constituents also show that Republican members mention immigration at a far higher rate than Democratic members do.22

Thus, as Figure 6 shows, the change in the percent of Americans who think that immigration is a “very important” issue is much larger among Republicans — from 58 percent in 2020 to 74 percent in 2024 — than among Democrats (41 percent in 2020 vs. 39 percent in 2024). It is no surprise, then, that Republicans shifted more than Democrats in favor of reducing immigration.

Conclusion

The trends in public opinion about racial inequality, discrimination, and immigration under Trump and Biden are a noteworthy departure. White Americans’ views about racial inequality and discrimination were virtually unchanged under Democratic and Republican presidents alike from 1988 to 2012 — what Christopher DeSante and Candis Watts Smith have described as a time of “racial stasis.”23 Under Trump, however, there were large shifts in attitudes about both race and immigration, mostly among Democrats who moved toward a more liberal stance. Under Biden, Democrats are a bit less liberal and Republicans a bit more liberal on racial issues in particular, creating a very modest decrease in partisan differences. On immigration, both parties have shifted to the right — but such shifts are at times larger among Republicans than Democrats.

We trace these trends to changes in the information environment — including the rhetoric and positions of Trump and Biden as well as the work of activists, social movements, and the news media. Trump eschewed a dog-whistle politics of code words that had long characterized Republicans’ messaging on race and instead made explicit racial appeals to white Americans.24 Democratic politicians, meanwhile, have become increasingly vocal in their support for racial equality. Especially after the murder of George Floyd, the Black Lives Matter movement focused attention on racial injustice and the conduct of police. All of this helped push Democratic voters toward more liberal views on race.

However, Trump’s and others’ attacks on this movement helped create a backlash, ensuring that there would be no broader shift among Republicans toward acknowledging or seeking to overcome racial injustice.25 And after the racial justice protests in the summer of 2020, the news media devoted less attention to topics related to racism. As a result, fewer Americans cited racial equality or police reform as major issues. And as president, Biden has pursued more moderate rhetoric and policies. Fewer Americans perceive Biden as favoring some racial groups over others, relative to Trump. All of these factors have helped produce modestly smaller partisan differences on racial issues.

On immigration issues, however, the story is different. There was the same liberal shift among Democrats during Trump’s presidency. But since then, the combination of record crossings at the U.S.-Mexico border, Biden’s own embrace of border enforcement, and criticism of his policies by Republican politicians has produced more restrictive public attitudes overall and sharp conservative shifts among Republican voters on issues like deportation.

The upshot of these trends is that attitudes about racial inequality, discrimination, and immigration appear to fit a popular model of public opinion: the thermostatic model of policy attitudes. In the thermostatic model, the public’s policy attitudes shift against the current president’s policies in response to real or perceived changes in the status quo — just like a thermostat will cool down a house when it gets too hot, or heat it up when it gets too cold.26

Thermostatic patterns have been frequently documented in attitudes toward government spending and programs. For example, Americans’ support for universal government health insurance dropped during Obama’s presidency and then increased as the Trump administration tried to repeal the Affordable Care Act in 2017.27 But for a long time, issues related to race and immigration did not display these thermostatic patterns.28

That no longer appears to be the case. The key reason is how the parties themselves have changed. With the two parties pushing in opposite directions on race and immigration even more than in the past, the public appears to be pushing back, with their opinions on these issues shifting to the left under Trump and back to the right under Biden. The emergence of these thermostatic patterns reflects the centrality of race and immigration to current partisan politics.
Moreover, this thermostatic pattern suggests a different story about what has happened, and may yet happen in U.S. politics. One theme in commentary about American opinion and policymaking on racial issues and immigration is that the country experienced a temporary “Great Awokening” that ultimately did not last. “Wokeness has peaked,” is now commonly invoked to describe American attitudes since 2020.29

But this interpretation does not fit some empirical patterns. For one, a number of survey questions show that much of the change experienced during this period has persisted. For another, on some questions about racial inequality Democrats and Republicans have moved in opposite directions. “Wokeness has peaked” does not help us understand why Democrats seem a bit less likely to express liberal attitudes about racial inequality but Republicans a bit more. Changes in elite opinion leadership — and particularly the contrast between Trump and Biden — provides a better explanation. Moreover, the trends in opinion differ, both overall and within parties, when the issue at hand is immigration rather than racial inequality. This too appears to derive from a combination of events, like the increase in border crossings, and how political leaders have responded to and communicated about those events.

Finally, if thermostatic patterns continue to characterize public opinion on these issues, then we should not anticipate a single peak in these attitudes followed by an inexorable decline. We should instead anticipate an ebb and flow in public opinion that depends on the party of the president, the direction of policymaking, and the messages citizens receive from political leaders. These predictable patterns may become the new “racial stasis” in American politics.

 

  1. Tankersley, Jim, and Michael D. Shear. 2021. “Biden Seeks to Define His Presidency by an Early Emphasis on Equity.” New York Times, January 23. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/23/business/biden-equity-racial-gender.html []
  2. Statement from President Joe Biden On the Bipartisan Senate Border Security Negotiations, January 26, 2024. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/26/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-the-bipartisan-senate-border-security-negotiations/ []
  3. On the development of this measure, see Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, “Divided by Color,” Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. On its meaning, see Cindy D. Kam and Camille D. Burge, “Uncovering Reactions to the Racial Resentment Scale across the Racial Divide,” The Journal of Politics, 2019, 80(1): pp. 314–320. []
  4. Griffin, Robert, Mayesha Quasem, John Sides, and Michael Tesler. 2021. Racing Apart. Democracy Fund Voter Study Group. See: https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/racing-apart []
  5. Engelhardt, Andrew M. 2023. “Observational Equivalence in Explaining Attitude Change: Have White Racial Attitudes Genuinely Changed?” American Journal of Political Science, 67: 411–425. []
  6. Although the sample sizes for Asian-American Democrats in these VOTER Survey waves are not large, the same patterns emerge in the Cooperative Election Study, a different survey project, which has much larger samples. Further analysis shows similar trends across education groups among white Americans. []
  7. The decline in the number of Democrats who said that Black people face a lot or a great deal of discrimination was evident in Democrats of all major racial and ethnic groups. Even among Black Democrats, there was a modest decline (from 89 percent to 82 percent). The declining number of Democrats saying that Latino people face high levels of discrimination was also evident across racial and ethnic groups, including Latino Democrats. []
  8. John Sides, Chris Tausanovitch, and Lynn Vavreck. 2022. The Bitter End: The 2020 Presidential Campaign and the Challenge to American Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 9. []
  9. Robert Griffin, Mayesha Quasem, John Sides, and Michael Tesler. 2021. Racing Apart. Democracy Fund Voter Study Group. https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/racing-apart []
  10. Two large-scale studies of elite leadership are: John Zaller. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press; and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2012. Follow the Leader?: How Voters’ Respond to Politicians’ Policies and Performance. Chicago University Press. On how partisans may react against the opposite party’s cues, see Stephen P. Nicholson. 2011.“Polarizing Cues.” American Journal of Political Science 56 (1): 52–66. []
  11. John Sides, Chris Tausanovitch, and Lynn Vavreck. 2022. The Bitter End: The 2020 Presidential Campaign and the Challenge to American Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Robert Griffin, Mayesha Quasem, John Sides, and Michael Tesler. 2021. Racing Apart. Democracy Fund Voter Study Group. https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/racing-apart []
  12. For the underlying data, see: https://api.gdeltproject.org/api/v2/summary/summary?d=iatv&t=summary&k=%28racism+OR+%22black+lives+matter%22+OR+%22george+floyd%22%29&ts=full&fs=station%3ACNN&fs=station%3AFOXNEWS&fs=station%3AMSNBC&svt=zoom&svts=zoom&swvt=zoom&ssc=yes&sshc=yes&swc=yes&stcl=yes&c=1 []
  13. This relationship between media attention to an issue and its perceived importance within the public is a conventional finding in political science research. See Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. 1987. News That Matters: Television and American Opinion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. []
  14. Perhaps relatedly, public support for Black Lives Matter has also fallen from its high point after George Floyd’s murder. See: https://civiqs.com/results/black_lives_matter?uncertainty=true&annotations=true&zoomIn=true. []
  15. In fact, we found that the less favorably white Americans felt toward Trump in 2020, the more their views of racial inequality shifted in a conservative direction between 2020 and 2024. []
  16. Anthony Salvanto, Jennifer De Pinto, and Fred Backus. 2023. “If Trump wins, more voters foresee better finances, staying out of war.” CBS News, November 5. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-vs-biden-poll-2024-presidential-election-year-out/ []
  17. See also Trent Ollerenshaw and Ashley Jardina. 2023. “The Asymmetric Polarization of Immigration Opinion in the United States.” Public Opinion Quarterly 87 (4): 1038–1053. []
  18. There is a similar pattern in the General Social Survey’s question about levels of immigration. For example, from 2016 to 2020, the percent of Democrats who supported increasing immigration grew from 25 percent to 39 percent. Republican support for decreasing immigration grew from 53 percent to 60 percent between 2018 and 2022. Changes in survey mode in the General Social Survey during 2021–22 complicate the ability to make comparisons over time, but these changes resemble what Gallup polls found. []
  19. See: https://civiqs.com/results/immigrants_citizenship?uncertainty=true&annotations=true&zoomIn=true. []
  20. Michael Tesler. 2023. “Why the border wall is getting more and more popular.” Good Authority, November 3. https://goodauthority.org/news/why-the-us-border-wall-is-getting-more-popular/ []
  21. A long line of research has shown that the volume of news coverage about an issue affects how important people think that issue is. See, for example, Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder. 1989. News that Matters. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. []
  22. This is based on a search for the word “immigration” in the database of Congressional email newsletters maintained by political scientist Lindsey Cormack at dcinbox.com. Republican mentions of immigration have outpaced Democratic mentions since Biden’s election. For example, in the period between September 14, 2023, and April 9, 2024, 1,425 GOP emails mentioned immigration, compared to 497 Democratic emails. []
  23. Christopher D. DeSante and Candis Watts Smith. 2020. Racial Stasis: The Millennial Generation and the Stagnation of Racial Attitudes in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. []
  24. Rogers M. Smith and Desmond King. 2021. “White Protectionism in America.” Perspectives on Politics 19 (2): 460–478. []
  25. Jefferson, Hakeem, and Victor Ray. 2022. “White Backlash is a Type of Racial Reckoning, Too.” FiveThirtyEight, January https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/white-backlash-is-a-type-of-racial-reckoning-too/ []
  26. The canonical study is Christopher Wlezien. 1995. “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending.” American Journal of Political Science 39 (4): 981–1000. []
  27. See polling by the Pew Research Center and Gallup: https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2018/10/03/most-continue-to-say-ensuring-health-care-coverage-is-governments-responsibility/. []
  28. Mary Layton Atkinson, K. Elizabeth Coggins, James A. Stimson, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2021. The Dynamics of Public Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press. However, some prior work has identified the possibility of thermostatic dynamics in attitudes toward government policies that affect Black Americans. See: Paul M. Kellstedt. 2000. “Media Framing and the Dynamics of Racial Policy Preference.” American Journal of Political Science 44 (2): 245–260. There is also evidence of thermostatic dynamics in Western European attitudes about immigration. See: Van Hauwaert, Steven M. 2023. “Immigration as a thermostat? Public opinion and immigration policy across Western Europe (1980–2017).” Journal of European Public Policy 30 (12): 2665–2691. []
  29. Yglesias, Matthew. 2019. “The Great Awokening.” Vox, April 1, https://www.vox.com/2019/3/22/18259865/great-awokening-white-liberals-race-polling-trump-2020. There are many pieces about “peak wokeness.” See, for example: Cowen, Tyler. 2022. “Wokeism has peaked.” Bloomberg, February 18, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-02-18/wokeism-has-peaked-in-america-but-is-still-globally-influential; or Traldi, Oliver. 2022. “Peak Woke?” City Journal, July 6, https://www.city-journal.org/article/peak-woke. []
Featured
Report

Field in Focus: The State of Pro-Democracy Institutional Philanthropy

Robert Griffin, Charlie Lobeck, Mariana Botero, Sarah Cooper, Michelle Diggles, Conor McKay, Eliza Steffen
/
January 22, 2024
  • Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Philanthropic support for promoting a healthy democracy has grown in recent years, marking a period of transformation for the field. Since 2016, an influx of funding, actors, and philanthropic infrastructure has amplified the impact of pro-democracy efforts while infusing the movement with needed dynamism.

At the same time, from a funder perspective these developments mean that today’s ecosystem is increasingly complex, confusing, and difficult to navigate. Sustaining the benefits of this transformation while avoiding the pitfalls of rapid growth requires a full understanding of funder capacities and needs.

Drawing insights from interviews and surveys conducted with 70 institutional funders, this report sheds new light on the state and direction of the democracy funding landscape. It describes:

  1. Field Magnitude and Growth — estimates of the size, scope, and directionality of democracy-related philanthropic funding.
  2. Field Focal Areas — insights on major focal areas for funding today, how that has changed over time, and where additional funding may be needed in the future.
  3. New Actors and Infrastructure — lessons on the experiences of newer funders and the evolving field of funding intermediaries.
  4. Looking Ahead — outstanding questions for future research and opportunities to strengthen the funding field.

Field Magnitude and Growth: Significant Growth from Institutional Philanthropy

It is well understood by those in the field that funding for democracy-related work has grown dramatically since 2016. Many survey respondents and interviewees note concern that this growth may soon wane. However, this research shows significant and sustainable funding growth from institutional philanthropy, even as questions remain about trends in other sources of field funding. Findings in this report include:

  • Among survey respondents, funding for democracy-related work is estimated to have grown between 42 percent and 61 percent in four years.
  • If other funders who were not surveyed grew at a similar rate, we estimate institutional philanthropy for democracy to have grown from between $3.8 billion and $4.3 billion in 2017–2018 ($1.9 billion and $2.1 billion on average per year) to between $5.4 billion and $6.9 billion in 2021–2022 ($2.7 billion and $3.4 billion on average per year).
  • Despite this growth, democracy funding remains small compared to that for other issues. The high estimate of $3.4 billion per year would account for only 0.7 percent of all philanthropic funding in the U.S. in 2022.
  • Institutional philanthropic funding for democracy is expected to grow further in 2023–2024, with 45 percent of survey respondents planning to increase funding and just 8 percent planning to decrease it compared to 2021–2022.
  • Surprisingly, the majority (57 percent) of survey respondents report having increased funding in 2021–2022 relative to 2019–2020 — during the last U.S. presidential election cycle — showing less cyclicality in funding from institutional philanthropy than expected.
  • Long-term and unrestricted funding is becoming more common across institutional philanthropy, despite concerns that funding growth has focused on short-term goals.
  • Importantly, these data provide insight into plans and trends among institutional funders, but field stakeholders remain concerned about trends in funding from other sources — including individual donors — especially as many grantees report fundraising challenges.

Field Focal Areas: Democracy Field Shifting and Maturing to Respond to Emerging Threats

The set of issues viewed by funders as core to the health of democracy includes many that have long been the focus of field efforts, while also incorporating newer foci that have emerged in response to evolving threats to democratic institutions and processes. Some recently expanded foci relate to threats that predate our institutions themselves, such as white supremacy and racial inequity, which philanthropy has historically played a role in exacerbating.

Other issues have come to the fore as a result of rapid technological change. Findings in this report include:

  • Voting and elections issues remain core to the field. Survey respondents cited efforts to protect voting rights (76 percent), election administration (73 percent), and voter engagement (86 percent) most often when describing work they funded in 2021–2022.
  • Survey respondents note strong and increasing support for newer focal areas, with 70 percent reporting funding for social and racial justice work and 59 percent reporting funding for media policy and misinformation and disinformation.
  • Many of the same issues are viewed as being underfunded, with media policy and misinformation/ disinformation and election administration cited most often as areas in need of greater attention and focus from funders.

New Actors and Infrastructure: Growing Role of Newer Funders and Intermediaries

In recent years, the democracy field has also attracted a large influx of new funders and has spurred creation of a host of new funding intermediaries — all with different motivations, interests, and foci. This changing landscape has made the field more dynamic and complex, contributing to an appetite among funders to better understand the nature of this growth and how to best capture the benefits while avoiding potential pitfalls. Findings in this report include:

  • The rise of authoritarianism is not the only driving factor in bringing newer funders to the field. Concerns about degrading democratic institutions and the interests and experience of new internal staff are also driving entrants to the space.
  • New entrants to the democracy funding field find relationships and networking to be most helpful to success in their early years, followed by access to relevant research and fresh perspectives from new staff and board members.
  • The number and role of funding intermediaries is growing, offering benefits, such as grantmaking convenience, and challenges, such as greater complexity of options.

Looking Ahead: Impact, Opportunity, and the Value of Community Building

Our research shows that the relatively small democracy funding field is growing and changing rapidly. And while these changes are viewed as positive overall, funders express a significant lack of clarity about the current funding landscape and even more uncertainty about what the future may hold. Growing in ways that meet the needs of the field and the moment requires building a far stronger community of funders and bridging current gaps in relationships, information, and funding approaches. Some opportunities include:

  • Community building, including that which further supports and engages newer funders.
  • Understanding grantee experiences, especially BIPOC-led and -serving organizations.
  • Defining democracy work and its focal areas to bolster future efforts to map the field.
  • Strengthening coordination across funders and across intermediaries.
  • Identifying and filling gaps for key subfields of democracy work that are underfunded.

Foreword

This report intends to take a critical step in providing a stronger, more comprehensive understanding of the evolving field of democracy-focused philanthropy in the United States — about where it has been, where it may be headed, and how funder perceptions and realities on the ground compare. There are still lingering questions about the current state and future trends, and there is certainly a need for more coordinated research and data collection. All such insights can help field stakeholders best achieve our shared goals: protecting and strengthening American democracy.

How can philanthropy better support the movement for a more inclusive, multiracial democracy?

Over the coming months and years, Democracy Fund will work with grantees and funders to better understand where philanthropy has been most impactful and where we are falling short — with the goal of creating resources that support funders in doing better. One of the first steps in this process is understanding more about how philanthropy is supporting the field today.

By our estimate, institutional philanthropy is currently investing an average of $2.7 to $3.4 billion a year to support democracy. This is a remarkable commitment and represents a dramatic increase from where we were at just five years ago. But that figure doesn’t tell the whole story.

For democracy to thrive, we need significant long-term commitments to the pillars that support it. While it’s encouraging that democracy funding has increased significantly in recent years — by our estimates, somewhere between 42 and 61 percent growth from 2017–2018 to 2021–2022 — we must do more. And we can: Less than one percent of philanthropy was devoted to democracy in 2022, while other issue areas still receive far more attention and support.

We know firsthand that the increasing number of intermediaries, programs, and activities supporting democracy has made it harder to clearly understand where resources are most needed and where philanthropy has become part of the problem. The infrastructure the field has constructed is remarkable, but its complexity requires deeper study to help funders maintain confidence that resources are being allocated effectively.

Until now, we’ve lacked hard data and corresponding analysis about the current state and direction of pro- democracy philanthropy. We commissioned this report as a first step toward filling that gap — to establish a baseline from which we can measure trends in the field. We look forward to working with partners to develop and release more data and reports that can refine our collective understanding.

We intend for Democracy Fund to play an increasing role in helping provide an unbiased look at the state and direction of the field, as well as to help us all better understand what it means to be an effective democracy funder. We believe that better data and improved information sharing can strengthen the collective sense of identity and community across the wide range of institutions engaged in this work.

For that data and information to be useful, it must reflect the diversity of the pro-democracy community and America itself. This report is limited by the set of institutions we were able to engage in this process — and we know that it tells an incomplete story. In the future, we will broaden our inputs by engaging more partners in these discussions and future surveys.

We look forward to continuing our work with a broad range of funders — from the long-standing to the newly interested — in support of an inclusive, multiracial democracy that is open, just, resilient, and trustworthy. The growth we’ve seen has helped produce some remarkable impact, and now is the time to double down on support for the field.

Joe Goldman
President, Democracy Fund

Lauren Hill
Senior Director of Partnerships, Democracy Fund

Introduction

For years, philanthropic institutions funding democracy-related work have struggled to fully understand the size and scope of the field. As more actors enter the space with new priorities and interests, even defining the field is a complex task. Publicly available data on field investments has also been limited, a historical trend that has persisted in part because funders often choose to maintain anonymity in the face of increased polarization, media scrutiny, and rising political violence. Still, funders need current, relevant data to inform strategic decisions.

Democracy Fund surveyed and interviewed more than 70 funders engaged in democracy-related work to help establish some of this information. Based on an in-depth analysis of funder insights and their implications for the future of the field, this report seeks to provide:

  • An up-to-date assessment of the size, scope, and directionality of democracy-related funding
  • Insights on potential gaps in the field
  • Details about the experiences of newer field funders that can bring more actors to the field and help recent entrants remain

Funders may use this report to inform their individual or collective funding strategies. Findings may be particularly valuable to new donors who wish to have a broader understanding of the space and its evolution.

The report includes aggregate data from survey respondents and quotes from respondents and interviewees — all of which have been anonymized. While more than 70 funders were engaged, the exact number engaged on any individual element or survey question varies. The report provides sample sizes for individual data points where applicable.1

 

 RESEARCH INPUTS

Surveys

  • 70 survey responses and direct input from foundations describing their democracy-related funding and key trends
  • 37 responding foundations shared topline funding totals for 2021-2022

Interviews/Qual Input

  • 17 interviews with field stakeholders, including
    • Funding intermediaries
    • Newer funders (<5 years in field)
    • Legacy funders (>5 years in field)
    • Other key stakeholders
  • Input on democracy issue categories from key anchor funders

Desk Research

  • Candid data over time
  • 40+ reports and articles from industry and mainstream sources, including:
    • Funders
    • Journals
    • News outlets

Confidential Data

  • Two sets of confidential internal democracy-related grant data – one for 2017- 2018 and one for 2021-2022 – each from a distinct sample of 12 foundations
  • Used on background to inform and validate findings, and for additional insights where appropriate

Our survey was distributed to a broad set of funding institutions known by Democracy Fund as supporters of democracy-related work, including many that are long-tenured field funders as well as many that began funding in the space more recently. Expert interviews were conducted with newer funders, individual donors, funding intermediaries, and other stakeholders with knowledge of the democracy funding landscape.

KEY TERMS

Some field-related terms mentioned frequently within this report are:

  • Institutional funders — registered foundations with sizeable endowments and annual payouts. These foundations’ grantmaking operations are typically managed by foundation staff, rather than by the founder(s) themselves or by outsourced consultants.
  • Individual donors — people who may have a registered foundation with little to no staff, or who give directly or through an intermediary such as a donor-advised fund. While there are some exceptions, individual donor payouts tend to be smaller than those of institutional funders.
  • Legacy funders — those who report having funded democracy work for more than five years.
  • New(er) funders — those who report having funded democracy work for less than five years.
  • Intermediaries — organizations and vehicles that support funders who prefer not to fund in this space directly or alone. Examples include donor-advised funds, fiscal sponsors, community foundations, and pooled funds/donor collaboratives.
  • Funding cycles — research periods of two years that account for peaks and downturns that might occur alongside the U.S. election cycle, recognizing that election-related funding makes up a significant portion of spending in the democracy space. For example, we review data for the 2017–2018, 2019–2020, and 2021–2022 cycles.

Field Magnitude and Growth

Significant Growth from Institutional Philanthropy

KEY FINDINGS IN THIS SECTION

  • Among survey respondents, funding for democracy-related work is estimated to have grown between 42 percent and 61 percent in four years.
  • If other funders who were not surveyed grew at a similar rate, we estimate institutional philanthropy for democracy to have grown from between $3.8 billion and $4.3 billion in 2017–2018 ($1.9 billion and $2.1 billion on average per year) to between $5.4 billion and $6.9 billion in 2021–2022 ($2.7 billion and $3.4 billion on average per year).
  • Despite this growth, democracy funding remains small compared to that for other issues. The high estimate of $3.4 billion per year would account for only 0.7 percent of all philanthropic funding in the U.S. in 2022.
  • Institutional philanthropic funding for democracy is expected to grow further in 2023– 2024, with 45 percent of survey respondents planning to increase funding and just 8 percent planning to decrease it compared to 2021–2022.
  • Surprisingly, the majority (57 percent) of survey respondents reported having increased funding in 2021–2022 relative to 2019–2020 — during the last U.S. presidential election cycle — showing less cyclicality in funding from institutional philanthropy than expected.
  • Long-term and unrestricted funding is becoming more common across institutional philanthropy, despite concerns that funding growth has focused on short-term goals.
  • Importantly, these data provide insight into plans and trends among institutional funders, but field stakeholders remain concerned about trends in funding from other sources — including individual donors — especially as many grantees report fundraising challenges.

Philanthropic interest in and support for promoting a healthy democracy have grown significantly in recent years, bolstered by an infusion of funding, actors, and infrastructure. Funders in this field have concerns about the sustainability of this interest, whether rapid growth has made the field more difficult to navigate, and what these changes to the funding landscape may mean for grantees and organizations on the ground.

This section of the report compares common perceptions about the funding landscape with what the data says about the size of the field and how it has changed since 2016. It also offers insights into primary drivers of that change and expectations for how it will evolve in the near future.

Funding from Institutional Philanthropy is Estimated to Have Grown 42 Percent–61 Percent from 2017 through 2022

To better understand the current landscape of philanthropic funding for democracy-related work and how it has grown and evolved since 2016, we leveraged several sources of data:2

  • Publicly available democracy-related grant data — taken from Candid’s “Foundation Funding for U.S. Democracy” tool, which maps all philanthropic funding for democracy-related work, for the time periods 2017–2018 and 2021–2022.3
  • An original survey of institutional funders — self-reported survey response data from 37 institutional funders, collected between April and August of 2023, describing their funding levels for democracy-related work in 2021–2022.4
  • Internal grant data for a small sample of participating foundations — two sets of confidential, internal democracy-related grant data — one for 2017–2018 and one for 2021–2022 — each from a distinct sample of 12 funding organizations, to compare with Candid data and survey data for validation and extrapolation.

To begin, we looked at the Candid database to assess both the overall amount of spending in the democracy space as well as how it has changed over time. Candid is a nonprofit that specializes in providing data and insights on U.S. nonprofits. In the 2017–2018 cycle, Candid documents about $3.5 billion in grants for democracy-related work from 9,144 funders to 12,493 grantees. By contrast, the same database documents only $1.7 billion in democracy- related funding across just 323 funders to 2,250 grantees in 2021–2022. Taken at face value, the database suggests a radical drop-off in both the number of funders and grantees as well as the overall amount of funding in the field.

While Candid is one of the most authoritative sources of data for U.S. philanthropic funding, there are several reasons to suspect these figures are underestimating the size of the field during both time periods. Candid’s methodology relies significantly on cataloging IRS data about philanthropic giving as well as submissions from philanthropic entities themselves. Because of this, the full amount of money going into democracy-related work may not be reflected for multiple reasons:

  • There is a several-year lag in publication of IRS data — which means that it is often years before a fuller picture of the field for a given period is available.
  • Cataloging IRS data is prone to under classification given the small amount of data available about any given grant.
  • Institutional giving to re-grantors or intermediaries — an increasingly common practice in philanthropy — is difficult to classify because both the intent and the recipient of the grant are obscured.

In addition to these methodological issues, it also appears to be the case that Candid has not updated its democracy-related database to include all relevant data from the years of interest — due in part to the lag previously mentioned. For instance, when reviewing the broader Candid database of funding across issues — from which Candid’s democracy-related database draws its funding data — the “Democracy” and “Voter Rights” categories alone account for $3.5 billion in funding for 2021–2022, compared to just $1.7 billion in the democracy- related database.5

This is obviously a problem for any kind of trend analysis using the democracy database as it would systematically undercount the amount of money in the field in recent years. Similarly, the data from Candid’s broader database, while helpful for validation on general sizing, employs a different taxonomy of issues than does the democracy database and our survey.

With all of these issues in mind, we leveraged a unique set of data — internal grantmaking records for 12 foundations with significant democracy portfolios during the 2017–2018 period — to see if these concerns were justified. In theory, we would expect these records to be more accurate about true funding levels for these institutions than the Candid database.

We compared the 2017–2018 data from Candid for these organizations with the records that the organizations themselves classified as being democracy-related and found a consistent undercount of funding. Specifically, Candid underestimated the size of these organizations’ democracy-related giving by anywhere from 3 percent to 93 percent — with an average of 20 percent undercount across all 12 institutions. Given that this period is well outside the typical IRS time lag, one conclusion is that this could mostly be explained by the other classification-related issues.

We conducted a similar exercise using the survey data described above. Specifically, 10 foundations that provided estimates of their democracy-related giving in 2021–2022 via our survey are included in Candid data for the period. When comparing these, the average undercount rate was 53 percent. While we believe that some of the same classification issues are at play, these exercises confirmed that despite Candid being the most comprehensive database currently available, some combination of these concerns result in it undercounting funding in the field. And while we highly suspect the self-reported data we have collected from institutional funders is more accurate on a case-by-case basis, it is limited in that it describes funding from dozens rather than hundreds or thousands of organizations.

With this in mind, we chose to triangulate between these three sources of data — leveraging the strength of each to better estimate both the size of the field and trends over time.

As a first pass, we created estimates for the size of the field using only funding that was directly documented. Specifically, that means funding that was documented in the Candid database in either period, in the 12 institutional internal funding records from 2017–2018, or in the 37 institutional survey responses for 2021–2022.

Using this method, the total funding mapped goes from $3.5 billion to $3.6 billion in 2017–2018 and $1.7 billion to $2.9 billion in 2021–2022.6

However, based on earlier comparisons between Candid data and these other sources of funding information, we have substantial reason to believe that the undercounting in both time periods is systemic. Taking those concerns seriously, we chose to develop an upper- and lower-bound estimate using undercount and growth rates from these records and survey data to enhance estimates from Candid.

To create our first estimate — the upper-bound estimate — we generally assumed that the undercounting and growth trends we document in our records and survey data are consistent across all organizations in the democracy space.

Specifically, for 2017–2018 we assume that the 20 percent rate of undercounting found for the smaller sample of 12 organizations in 2017–2018 is consistent across all funders in Candid’s database. Adjusted for that undercount, we would now estimate that funding in that period was closer to $4.3 billion.

To estimate democracy funding totals for 2021–2022, we make two calculations. First, we compare self-reported democracy funding totals for 2021–2022 among survey respondents with the undercount-adjusted Candid totals for the same foundations for 2017–2018. This analysis suggests funding among these organizations for democracy- related work grew by an estimated 61 percent over the period. Specifically, 81 percent (25 of 31 for which data were available) of funders in this sample are estimated to have increased their funding over the period — often by substantial amounts — while just 19 percent (six of 31) decreased their funding.

Second, assuming the same growth rate for all funders in Candid’s data for 2017–2018, we project the magnitude of funding among this larger sample to have grown from $4.3 billion in 2017–2018 ($2.1 billion on average per year) to $6.9 billion in 2021–2022 ($3.4 billion on average per year).7,8

The reason we consider this an upper-bound estimate is that it is entirely possible that the undercounting and growth trend estimates from our sample of records and survey respondents is not representative of the larger universe of democracy funders. In the case of the undercounting, the 12 organizations for which we have internal funding data from 2017–2018 represent institutions that are relatively large. It is certainly possible that the methodological issues that lead to undercounting in Candid are more likely to manifest among these larger organizations. If true, this would overestimate the rate of undercounting in Candid.

Similarly, it is certainly possible that foundations that increased their democracy-related funding during this period were more likely to respond to our survey. If true, this would over-estimate the rate of growth between 2017–2018 and 2021–2022.

Given these concerns, we also created what we’ll refer to as the lower-bound estimate. In this projection, we assumed the rate of undercounting in Candid for other funders was only half the rate found in this project (10 percent, instead of 20 percent) and that those funders experienced only half the rate of growth between these two periods (30 percent, instead of 61 percent). Under these assumptions, we estimate the field has grown from $3.8 billion in 2017–2018 ($1.9 billion on average per year) to $5.4 billion in 2021–2022 ($2.7 billion on average per year).

While under no illusions about the potential issues with the assumption behind these projections — discussed more fully below — we believe they represent a good faith and comprehensive attempt to marry disparate and imperfect sources of data.

Democracy Funding in Context

Despite growth within the field, democracy funding accounted for less than 1 percent of philanthropy in the United States in 2022, and many noted concerns that field funding is still not sufficient to meet the scale of challenges and needs. Giving USA — a public service initiative that produces an annual report that provides a comprehensive look at all philanthropic giving in the United States — reports that total giving across all issue areas in 2022 at roughly $500 billion9

Our estimate of $3.4 billion in average funding per year for democracy work would amount to 0.7 percent of this total. Though democracy funding has grown more quickly than all philanthropy since 2018 (61 percent versus 17 percent) and its share has increased over time, other discrete issue areas still saw far greater investment in 2022.

In this context, many continue to see democracy as an area of underinvestment, particularly given that a healthy democracy is a critical prerequisite to realizing change and impact in other fields. As one interviewee put it, democracy-related investment “could unlock impact in other downstream areas.”

Limitations of Data and Analyses

In the course of conducting research, it is always worthwhile to take a step back and consider the ways in which a given source of data may be flawed or otherwise limited. In this case, our analysis is based in large part on self-reported survey data and therefore subject to a wide variety of potential issues. While we stand behind the analysis presented above, it is worth considering potential sources of bias:

  • Aggregate trends and funder perspectives inherently miss grantee experiences — These estimates describe field funding and growth in the aggregate, based on surveying funders. However, the experience for individual grantees and field organizations will certainly vary. In particular, BIPOC-led organizations and those serving underrepresented communities historically have been disadvantaged in receiving philanthropic funding. It is entirely possible, and even probable, that the distribution of this funding growth was unequal and that the overall growth reported here does not reflect the experiences of every organization. For instance, BIPOC-led organizations may have had significantly more difficult experiences entering the field than funders overall. This is an important area for future research.
  • Definitions of democracy work differ across data sources, impacting comparability — The categories of work included in Candid’s taxonomy of the field (used to assess 2017–2018 funding) differ slightly from those used for the survey (used to assess 2021–2022 funding). The taxonomy used for the survey was designed as an update to Candid’s taxonomy, with a goal of rearranging categories and understood sub-areas to better match current field foci. For instance, our taxonomy includes a dedicated category for social and racial justice work — an area of significant focus for field funders particularly of late — yet much of this work likely fell within prior existing categories, such as the civil liberties and rule of law category and the issue-based participation category. Therefore, some amount of the estimated growth over time could be attributed to changes in definitions, potentially biasing estimates upward given the more expansive taxonomy. A fuller discussion of the new taxonomy and the changes included are described in this report’s section on Field Focal Areas, as well as in the Appendix.
  • Estimates rely on data about funders in 2017–2018, yet the population of funders in this field has likely shifted — These totals are also limited to estimated growth among funders included in Candid’s database as of 2017– 2018, which primarily consists of institutional philanthropy. This sample inherently excludes newer field entrants since that period, while also including some institutions that may have stopped funding in the space. It also does not appropriately account for funding and growth from individual donors, as not one funder in this sample was categorized by Candid as an “Individual” donor. If this research were to capture these other sources of funding, the overall magnitude of estimated field funding would be larger, and the estimated growth over the period also might be higher.
  • Survey sample is possibly biased toward funders with larger funding growth — The survey was distributed to a set of funders known to Democracy Fund as supporting democracy work, due to existing awareness and relationships as well as publicly available information. Of those that received the survey, only 47 percent responded to the survey or otherwise provided topline information on their democracy funding. It is possible that funders who are decreasing funding or exiting the field entirely may have been less likely to be included in the initial sample and less likely to respond to the survey even if they were included. If true, this would lead us to overestimate both the size of the field today and its growth over the period analyzed.
  • Datasets may contain different amounts of 501(c)(4) funding data — Survey data included in these calculations account for only 501(c)(3) funding, while Candid data are intended to be inclusive of both 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) funding. However, it is unclear to what extent Candid data for 2017–2018 accounts for 501(c)(4) funding, and how large this amount would be relative to the total funding for the period. If the data in Candid for 2017–2018 includes large amounts of 501(c)(4) funding, this would lead us to underestimate the rate at which Candid undercounts 501(c)(3) funding and would likely lead us to underestimate growth in 501(c)(3) funding over the period.10

Institutional Philanthropy for Democracy Work is Expected to Grow Further in 2023–2024

Even with the understanding that the field of democracy funders has grown since 2016, the future remains unclear. Many note anxiety that recent field growth may decline — both in the number of funders engaged and the amount of funding available — based on the sense that the worst crises of recent years have passed. In particular, these concerns often center on newer field funders and individual donors viewed as less committed to the space long- term. Several survey respondents shared these sentiments:

  • “I’m worried that some of the new energy and funding that came out of the 2016–2020 era is starting to drop.”
  • “I think there is a growing complacency and lack of urgency around these issues as a result of Trump no longer being in office, when in fact the authoritarian threat is growing, not decreasing.”
  • “I hear that overall giving is down and there is some donor fatigue in play, which is concerning given the challenges and opportunities in the space at the moment.”

These concerns align with reports from grantees and grassroots organizations that fundraising for nonpartisan democracy work related to the 2023–2024 election cycle has been slower than in recent cycles, particularly from individual donors — a trend described anecdotally by interviewees.

While funding trends from newer funders and individual donors are difficult to predict, it should be encouraging to note that most of the institutional funders that responded to our survey plan to increase or maintain funding levels going forward. Of respondents, 45 percent (24 of 53) reported that they plan to increase democracy-focused funding in 2023–2024 from that issued in 2021–2022, and 47 percent (25 of 53) reported that their funding will stay the same. Only 8 percent (four of 53) reported that they plan to decrease funding.

Some survey respondents noted that 2023–2024 funding decisions, while expected to increase or remain constant, had yet to be finalized. In part, this was due to internal planning dynamics, as funders indicated they were still in the process of developing programmatic goals and strategies. Others note this was a deliberate delay to see what issues or funding gaps emerge — reflecting both a response to concerns about potential funding shortfalls as well as a potential factor contributing to slow field fundraising to date.

With the combination of delays in funding decisions by institutional philanthropy and reported fundraising challenges from individual or newer donors, it is understandable that grantees are feeling cross-pressured, finding resources scarce at a time when many expected to be expanding operations.

Respondents were also asked what led to changes in their funding priorities between the 2021–2022 and 2023– 2024 funding cycles. The most common reason funders identified for both changing their funding strategy and increasing funding was a desire to grow support for specific subtopics. For instance, one respondent shared that “the foundation has shifted its focus to center racial justice and equity, [addressing root causes,] structural racism, and systems change.” Another shared that “[the foundation] intend[s] to deepen [its] work on election infrastructure and misinformation and disinformation.”

CAVEATS TO PLANNED FUNDING FINDINGS

There are three caveats to consider when looking at findings about planned funding growth:

  • Some growth may be cyclical — although survey data suggest less cyclicality than expected — Given that 2024 is a U.S. presidential election year, some of this expected increase in funding may be cyclical. However, there are reasons to believe that this represents real non-cyclical growth. A similar number of survey respondents also reported having increased (57 percent, 30 of 53) or maintained (28 percent, 15 of 53) funding in 2021–2022 relative to 2019–2020 — despite the latter being the past presidential election cycle. Taken at face value, this may suggest more funding stability between electoral cycles overall within institutional philanthropy. In the reasons survey respondents gave for increased funding over the period, some did point to time-bound crises that won’t persist — such as funding responses to the events of January 6, 2021 — still many noted a broader range of factors that we might expect to sustain over time, e.g., a number reported increased support for media and journalism issues.
  • Survey sample is possibly biased toward funders planning to increase funding — These findings may be subject to sample bias, as those expecting to decrease funding in the space may have been less likely to respond to the survey. Further, high-net-worth donors who may have been more recent entrants in the field were not included substantially in the survey. If true, our findings may represent an overly rosy picture of future funding plans among not only institutional funders, but also the field writ large.
  • Aggregate trends may differ from grantee experiences — It is worth noting that the trends among funders identified here would not necessarily align with the experiences of individual grantees. It may be the case that increased funding disproportionately serves new grantees or flows through new intermediaries, and therefore may not result in higher funding levels for pre-existing organizations. Further, we know from prior research that BIPOC-led nonprofits and those serving communities of color tend to receive less support than their white-led and white-serving counterparts.11 Thus, while indicators of increased funding levels overall is a positive sign, we should be cautious in how we interpret the impact this has for organizations on the ground.

Multiyear and Unrestricted Funding are Becoming More Common Across Institutional Philanthropy

Several interviewees and survey respondents cited concerns that the field lacks sufficient long-term and unrestricted funding for grantees. In particular, newer funders and individual donors were perceived as being overly focused on short-term goals. As two respondents noted:

  • “It’s great that there’s a heavy focus on elections, but so little long-term thinking [is] happening in the democracy”
  • “Some donors do not provide predictable, reliable, consistent funding to organizations to be able to sustain their work year-round and create multiyear plans for the future.”

However, while it may be difficult to assess the focus of newer funders and individual donors on these approaches, survey respondents report high levels of long-term and unrestricted funding, as part of a trend across philanthropy overall to move toward trust-based practices. The majority of survey respondents (62 percent) reported that at least half of their 2021–2022 democracy-related grants are multiyear versus one year or less. Similarly, the vast majority (72 percent) report that at least half their grants are for general operating support.

Increasingly, it appears that multiyear grants and general operating support are becoming normalized among institutional funders of democracy work. For example, among foundations that made confidential 2017–2018 internal data available, the majority reported higher rates of both general support and multiyear grants in 2021–2022 than appears in their grantmaking data for the prior period.

As one respondent noted:

“[The foundation] started supporting grantees in the longer term after the 2016 election because [its staff] were concerned that the issue of voting rights was not going away. [The staff] listened to [its] grantees about the need for consistent, multiyear funding and now [the foundation is] approaching more of [its] democracy funding from a long-term perspective.”

Despite these trends, grantees continue to voice the need for more long-term support, and more improvements in this regard may well be warranted. For instance, in internal grant data for select foundations, we found that while 50 percent of democracy-related grants made in 2021–2022 were for at least 24 months, just 23 percent of grants exceeded two years, and less than 10 percent of grants exceeded three years.

Additionally, the length of grants likely differs across issue areas. For instance, in reviewing confidential 2021–2022 grantmaking data for select foundations, grants for voting rights and voter engagement work were 15 percent shorter on average (18 months) than all other grants (21 months), while those for civil liberties and rule of law were 22 percent longer on average (26 months).

Stakeholders Continue to be Concerned about Timing of Funding and 501(c)(4) Funding Levels

Interviewees and survey respondents also shared concerns about the timing of field funding. Many noted that funding often reaches grantees too late to be most useful, especially in the context of election-related funding. Some also reported feeling that 501(c)(4) funding levels are too low overall. Unlike 501(c)(3) funding, 501(c)(4) funding enables social welfare organizations to engage in unlimited lobbying activities related to the organization’s exempt purpose and engage in limited partisan activity, such as endorsing candidates or conducting get-out-the-vote campaigns based on party affiliation, though such partisan activities cannot be its primary purpose.12)

Survey respondents note a trend toward grants coming later within election cycles, as funders increasingly take a “wait and see” approach before setting funding strategies, in hopes of better targeting funds to areas of greatest need and opportunity. While this can enable responsiveness to emerging challenges, it can also make it difficult for grantees and funders alike to plan ahead and leverage funding fully. In the words of one respondent: “I worry about funding moving too late, when groups need early resources to be most effective and impactful.”

Some evidence bears this out. For instance, one interviewee from a funding intermediary, in reviewing funding flows, noted that “there is a drop-off in democracy funding across the board and it’s coming in later…” However, the same interviewee also noted that “things always drop off and then pick back up later,” suggesting increased funding levels could be expected to eventually materialize, albeit with shifts in timing.

There is a perception that this trend is especially true for funding from individual donors. However, it is apparent even in institutional philanthropy. Many survey respondents described their own approach in similar ways, noting that with current information they aren’t yet ready to lock in strategies for the 2023–2024 cycle. For instance, one respondent shared: “Depending on emerging threats we may increase funding in certain areas to meet the moment. It is still too early to know.”

Funders also note concern that work to promote a healthy democracy has too little 501(c)(4) funding and share a perception that “anti-democracy” efforts are better resourced in this regard. Of those surveyed, most respondents (74 percent, 26 of 35) indicated they do not have an affiliated 501(c)(4) that funds democracy-related work. Respondents that do (23 percent, eight of 35) reported just over $105 million in annual 501(c)(4) funding for related activities in 2021– 2022.13 Just 12 of the 141 funders (9 percent) included in the survey distribution have easily identifiable 501(c)(4) affiliates.

This point was reinforced by a representative from a pooled fund who noted “a lot of funders are not experienced with the (c)(4) side.” One interviewee shared that their “biggest criticism of the democracy field is that there isn’t more (c)(4) funding. (c)(3) funders aren’t sufficient.”

Some stakeholders note that some newer funders to the field — particularly individual donors who have traditionally engaged in campaign and political funding — have brought more 501(c)(4) funding to the table. However, stakeholders also convey some wariness that these trends could amplify perceptions that the field is becoming increasingly political or partisan.

Field Focal Areas

Democracy Field Shifting and Maturing to Respond to Emerging Threats

KEY FINDINGS IN THIS SECTION

  • Voting and elections issues remain core to the field. Survey respondents cited efforts to protect voting rights (76 percent), election administration (73 percent), and voter engagement (86 percent) most often when describing work they funded in 2021–2022.
  • Survey respondents note strong and increasing support for newer focal areas, with 70 percent reporting funding for social and racial justice work and 59 percent reporting funding for media policy and misinformation and disinformation.
  • Many of the same issues are viewed as being underfunded, with media policy and misinformation/disinformation and election administration cited most often as areas in need of greater attention and focus from funders.

The democracy funding field includes a broad and growing array of focal areas, actors, and funders. The set of issues seen by funders as core to the health of democracy includes many that have long been the focus of field efforts, while also incorporating newer foci that have emerged in response to evolving threats to democratic institutions and processes. Some recent foci relate to threats that predate our institutions themselves, such as white supremacy and racial inequity, which philanthropy has historically played a role in exacerbating. Others target newer trends resulting from rapid technological change.

Given this shifting landscape and the increasing understanding of the fundamental role a healthy democracy plays in ensuring effective outcomes in other issue areas, it can be difficult to neatly define what constitutes “democracy-related work.” Unsurprisingly, many stakeholders report confusion — and even frustration — in trying to navigate the space and their role in it.

This section of the report details the areas of democracy-related work included in this study and how this set of focal areas has evolved over time. It also provides insights on the relative attention that different sub-issues have received and notes where increased attention from funders may be warranted.

Democracy Field Maturing to Include New Focal Areas, Greater Intersectionality

In order to better understand the current field of democracy philanthropy today, there must first be a clear understanding of what that field includes. Unfortunately, field stakeholders note the lack of a broadly shared definition for what falls within the boundaries of democracy work today — often leading to questions and confusion.

In 2015, Candid worked with a broad set of field stakeholders to develop a seminal shared taxonomy of issue areas included in the democracy field.14To date, this taxonomy remains the most widely used. However, in more recent years — particularly in response to major events and emerging threats since 2016 — the field has developed newer focal areas that were not explicitly included in this prior taxonomy. In many cases, areas of work that were previously understood as sub-fields or minor foci — perhaps as a part of other definitions or captured in Candid’s “Other” category — require more dedicated categorization today.

For the purposes of this study, we worked with a collection of stakeholders in the funder community to develop potential updates to the Candid taxonomy that could account for recent trends and newer focal areas. The resulting taxonomy, described in detail in the

Appendix, includes several areas of new and increased focus in recent years, including:

  • Ensuring an effective census and redistricting process
  • Promoting racial and social justice
  • Preventing political violence and anti-hate efforts
  • Tracking and combating misinformation and disinformation

In addition to a changing landscape of focal areas within democracy work, stakeholders also note a greater understanding of the fact that democracy-related work is deeply intertwined with other issue areas, which is seen as a significant cause for recent funding growth. For instance, some funders may invest in voter education and outreach in order to catalyze action on climate change. Others may fund government effectiveness and reform efforts in order to support better administration of programs of interest, such as the implementation of new federal funding for infrastructure.

These types of investments from funders seeking impact in other areas are becoming more common. One survey respondent shared that more funders are entering the space because “there is an appreciation that progress cannot be made on other issues (health, climate) without philanthropic attention on underlying democracy issues.” This has brought more engagement in democracy work, but also contributes to perceived confusion over what types of work and funders are or are not included in the conception of the field.

CATEGORIES OF DEMOCRACY WORK INCLUDED IN SURVEY

Voting and Elections†

  • Voting Rights†
  • Voter Education and Engagement†
  • Election Administration
  • Campaign Finance
  • Redistricting

Inclusion, Equity, and Justice*

  • Social and Racial Justice*
  • Social Cohesion and Polarization*
  • Political Violence and Anti-Hate*

Civic Education and Participation†

  • Civic Education and Leadership
  • Public and Issue Based
  • Participation‡
  • Census*

Government Effectiveness and Democracy Protection†

  • Civil Rights/Liberties and Rule of Law†
  • Government Oversight and Reform‡

Media and Information Ecosystem†

  • Journalism‡
  • Media Policy and Mis/ Disinformation†

General/Non-Issue Specific*

Other Issues

Differences from Candid’s original taxonomy of democracy-related funding

* Not previously included as a dedicated category

† Updated title only

‡ New category created by combining existing categories

Full definitions for each category, as provided to survey participants, are included in Appendix.

Broad Engagement Across Issue Areas, Including Newer Foci

Survey respondents supported a wide breadth of issues in 2021–2022, with each area of work receiving support from many funders.

Among our survey respondents, voter education and engagement (86 percent, 32 of 37), voting rights (76 percent, 28 of 37), and election administration (73 percent, 27 of 37) were the most commonly funded areas in the democracy space in 2021–2022. These issues have seen larger investment in recent years. For instance, campaigns, elections, and voting issues accounted for just 9 percent of all democracy funding recorded by Candid in 2016, while funding for these issues increased to 26 percent in 2020.

The survey also shows significant interest and support for issues that were not historically core areas of field focus. Nearly 70 percent of respondents (26 of 37) report having funded social and racial justice work in the 2021–2022 cycle; this area has not always been considered by philanthropy, with its historically white and elite biases, as a dedicated category of work. Additionally, 59 percent (22 of 37) report funding for media policy and combating misinformation and disinformation, while 54 percent (20 of 37) report funding for journalism. These are areas that have matured alongside the fast-evolving media, technology, and information landscape.

Bar charts show that funders support a wide variety of pro-democracy issue areas, with election issues such as Voter Education/Engagement and Voting Rights attracting the greatest support, and Campaign Finance, the Census, and Government Oversight/Reform receiving the least.

However, when reviewing internal grant data from a sample of 12 foundations, including 2,403 grants totaling $1.1 billion, we found that the volume and funding across these categories varied significantly.

For instance, in this sample, areas with far more grants and funding include social and racial justice work and public and issue-based participation. By contrast, voting rights, voter education and engagement, and election administration have fewer grants and less funding, despite the largest number of funders having reporting funding in these areas in our survey.

Areas with the smallest number of grants and far less funding in this sample included those that are off cycle, such as redistricting and census, as well as areas that are more targeted in nature, such as social cohesion and anti-hate. These analyses are highly dependent on the accuracy of issue-coding performed by our team, based on reading grant purpose statements provided directly by funders.

Of funders that reported increased funding in the 2021–2022 cycle relative to the 2019–2020 cycle, many explicitly noted increased focus on racial justice issues, COVID-19 related issues, and misinformation and disinformation.

Some areas of work that had attracted a greater share of efforts to promote a healthy democracy in prior eras — such as campaign finance and government oversight and reform work — were supported by a minority of survey respondents in the 2021–2022 cycle and appear lower in the sample of internal grant data. Interestingly, of the 12 survey respondents who report they have funded causes in the democracy space for less than five years, none reported having funded these areas in 2021–2022.

These newer funders were slightly more likely to report having funded voting rights, voter engagement, and election administration efforts than did legacy funders. They also reported especially heavy engagement in newer field focal areas like social and racial justice, as well as misinformation and disinformation.

Bar charts compare funding for 16 pro-democracy issues and show that Public and Issue-Based Participation received the most funding at $412 million, while the Census received the least at just $2 million.

Funders Note Greater Attention Needed on Media Issues and Election Administration

Survey respondents note a broad range of potential areas of need for the field moving forward, underscoring the diversity of interests and approaches across funders working in the democracy field. When asked which areas of democracy-related work need greater attention from funders, no area received more than 50 percent of responses.

Issues relating to building a healthy information ecosystem rise to the top as needing greater attention. This includes media policy, misinformation, and disinformation (38 percent, 20 of 53) as well as journalism (28 percent, 15 of 53). Two more respondents used the open-ended response to specifically note artificial intelligence and algorithms as areas of concern, which may be considered as possible sub-issues within the misinformation and disinformation space.

Given that these media and technology-related issues are newer areas of focus generally, these findings may be unsurprising and suggest room for continued growth and engagement. Importantly, some respondents noted significant new initiatives, investments, and engagement in these areas. And many conveyed optimism that related work will continue to grow and attract more funders.

The second largest number of respondents (36 percent, 19 of 53) note election administration as needing greater focus. This aligns with both the growing threats to fair elections seen in recent years as well as with concerns shared by field stakeholders that some funders may incorrectly believe these threats are now behind us. One funder noted that “election security is not well funded. The integrity of elections and elected officials being supported is not something that often comes to mind in the democracy space.”

 Bar charts report which pro-democracy issues funders believe need more attention. Mis/Disinformation and Election Administration were cited most often as needing greater attention with 20 and 19 responses respectively.

New Actors and Infrastructure

Growing Role of Newer Funders and Intermediaries

KEY FINDINGS IN THIS SECTION

  • The rise of authoritarianism is not the only driving factor in bringing newer funders to the field. Concerns about attacks on democratic institutions and the interests and experience of new internal staff are also driving entrants to the space.
  • New entrants to the democracy funding field find relationships and networking to be most helpful to success in their early years, followed by access to relevant research and fresh perspectives from new staff and board members.
  • The number and role of funding intermediaries is growing, offering benefits, such as grantmaking convenience, and challenges, such as greater complexity of options.

Newer democracy field funders — institutional funders and individual donors that have begun funding democracy-related work in the past five years — have contributed to growth of the democracy field as well as its increased complexity. The field today consists of a more varied set of funders, engaged on a wider set of issues, and exhibiting a broader set of motivations and interests.

Additionally, there are more resources and infrastructure for funders, including growth in the size and number of funding intermediaries. These allow for coordination and alignment across this ecosystem — from rapid- response pooled funds supporting election security to networks for building learning communities around civic engagement and political polarization. This growth has allowed the field to become more dynamic and complex.

Field stakeholders are now beginning to grasp the threats and opportunities that this growth in diversity, dynamism, and complexity may mean for the future of the field. Several lingering questions we encountered are:

  • Whether newer funders will remain in the field
  • Which resources may be most useful for keeping them in the field
  • The best strategies to build a philanthropic community that can welcome these newer funders and their unique value adds

Different stakeholders are exploring how to optimize the benefits of increased field infrastructure, while avoiding the unintended complexity. One of these is increased anonymity for individual funders and therefore less transparency about who is funding whom, at what level, and what subtopics they are supporting.

This section of the report examines the perceptions and experiences of newer funders. It seeks to identify what is known and less apparent about their motivations and interests, and it explores the growing role of intermediaries in this developing ecosystem.

Rise of Authoritarianism Not the Only Driving Factor in Bringing Newer Funders to the Field

To understand the experiences and motivations of newer funders, and to compare these with perceptions held by legacy funders about newer funders, the survey asked parallel questions of each group. In many important areas, these perceptions differ from reality, leaving important opportunities for improving communication and understanding between groups.

Bar charts compare the perspectives of legacy funders and new funders on the obstacles to funding democracy-related activities. 61% of Legacy Funders believe information/resources to be the biggest challenge, while just 40% of new funders agree. Political perceptions featured the largest gap between legacy funders (55%) and new funders (30%).

Legacy funders’ perspectives on why new funders have entered the space and the barriers to entry they have faced differ from the experiences shared by newer funders. Nearly half of legacy funders (18 of 37) noted changes in the national political landscape — particularly factors related to the rise of authoritarianism in the U.S. — as the main driver for newer funders entering the space, while more than half (53 percent) cited political perceptions about the work as likely the main barrier to entry. By contrast, just 17 percent of newer funders (two of 12) cited authoritarianism as a motivation, and only 25 percent (three of 12) cited political perceptions as a barrier.

Though these gaps may be due to reluctance among respondents in sharing motivations that could be construed as political in nature, the motivations newer funders did share ultimately showed wider variety than the perceptions shared by legacy funders. In their survey responses, new funders cite varied reasons for entering the field, including concerns about attacks on democratic institutions more broadly, the interests and experience of new internal staff or leadership, along with Trump-related issues.

For Newer Funders, Relationships and Networking are Key

Legacy funders and new funders alike understand the importance of networking and connections for new entrants. When asked which factors helped most when they decided to start funding democracy work, 67 percent (eight of 12) of newer funders cited networks and connections as the most important. One newer funder noted in an interview that, after the chaotic “panic” of 2020 had subsided, they found that it became much easier to engage more meaningfully in the space as other field stakeholders have had more capacity to engage and welcome them.

Bar charts show that legacy funders and new funders largely agree on helpful assets. Network/Connections are viewed as most helpful by both legacy funders (89%) and new funders (73%).

Newer Field Funders Display Wide Range of Backgrounds and Interests

Newer field funders differ in their interests, engagements to date, and plans for the future. They approach their philanthropic giving from a range of lenses: an issue area lens, a geographic lens, a project approach lens, and a racial equity lens, among others. Several interviewees noted that some new funders make grant decisions based on the secondary impact that a stronger, more inclusive democracy could create. For instance, some democracy grants could help ensure clean energy investments are effectively implemented, and others could help foster thriving local economies. As one survey respondent described it, “There has been increasing awareness and alarm about the threats to our democracy and this has attracted new funders to the field — funders who are able to see how the health of our democracy underpins and connects to other issue areas.”

Given the breadth of approaches funders take, it is important not to view them as a single homogenous group. Instead, we looked at different new funder profiles to better understand their experiences, described below. These newer funders include both institutional funders and individual donors, generally with slightly different but overlapping motivations:

  • Institutional funders — registered foundations with larger endowments and annual payouts and that are typically fully staffed. Many institutional funders have increased their annual grantmaking budget for democracy issues since 2016 and plan to maintain or increase funding in 2023–2024. A few others have shifted democracy grantmaking that was previously part of a temporary initiative or housed in a different portfolio area into a full, permanent program. Still others had never previously funded democracy-related activities but have recently turned toward this work as an entirely new focal area.
  • Individual donors — who may have a registered foundation with little to no staff, or they may choose to give directly or through an intermediary such as a donor-advised fund. A number of high-net-worth individual donors recently entered the field, and stakeholders often note three key categories as being particularly prevalent: those with inherited wealth,15 wealthy executives from the finance world,16 and newly wealthy technology executives from Silicon Valley. Individual donors support work across the full spectrum of democracy sub-areas, although many have focused on funding democracy work with a technology, social entrepreneurship, and data-forward lens. While some individual donors may have established funding strategies, their giving also has been described as more nimble and responsive to their interest and needs of the moment. Some see individual donors as being more short-term focused.

Whether institutional funders or individual donors, many come to democracy issues from different backgrounds and motivations. Below are additional categories that can describe some of these newer field funders. These are based on survey responses from those who report having funded democracy-related causes for five years or fewer, qualitative discussions with stakeholders who regularly engage with and support newer field funders, and independent research. These categories are intended to be neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive.

  • Place-based funders — a number of typically local, state, or regionally focused funders have begun to support democracy efforts in their priority geographies, including work such as civic participation, voting rights, and local journalism. For instance, some groups funded census outreach and community organizing around redistricting during the 2020–2022 census and redistricting cycle. Some have even shifted to funding such work beyond their regional focus.
  • Issue-based funders — those focused on one or more specific non-democracy issue areas, who have more recently come to democracy work as a lever for seeking impact on those issues. In some cases, this may be in response to decades of inaction and frustration, and a perception that new strategies must be considered (this is the case among many climate funders). In other cases, it may be in support of more acute needs in response to external policy changes or threats (such as among recent field entrants focused on protecting reproductive rights). For example, one newer funder who had previously focused primarily on social entrepreneurship and innovation explained that “everything we want to do requires the government to either enable it or to amplify it through scaling effective solutions, so we realized that democracy is critical to any progress.”
  • Social justice funders — as the definition of democracy funding has broadened to include social and racial justice as prime focal areas, this has enabled longtime social justice funders to be brought more fully into democracy funding networks. Additionally, some funders deepened their social and racial justice work following the murder of George Floyd and in response to inequities that became more stark during the COVID-19 pandemic. In many cases, this deepening justice work included greater investment in initiatives on voting, elections, civil rights, and related issues alongside movement-building efforts.
  • Political funders — those individual funders or organizations that have been major partisan donors or fundraisers to individual campaigns, PACs, and super PACs have more recently begun to engage in nonpartisan democracy work. For instance, Way to Win, a progressive political fundraising hub, recently established a 501(c)(3) grantmaking operation, Way to Rise, which has distributed over $5 million to state and local nonprofits working on co-governance, voter protection and education, and narrative change.17

One funder shared their interpretation of growth and evolution of the field over this time period: “My mental model on funders in the last five years in the democracy space is that there were legacy funders (anyone in space before 2017); then there was a rush of funders who came in around 2017/2018; then there was another wave of funders who have come in in the last two to four years who had been dipping their toes in the water a little bit, but have now evolved to more stable funders in the space.”

Newer funders, especially individual donors, have much to offer the democracy field. These contributions bring new perspectives on sub-issues like misinformation and disinformation and media policy, the ability to experiment with entrepreneurial policy reform and interventions, and the ability to provide 501(c)(4) support. Funders moving into the democracy field from other areas also have a different set of expectations than do legacy funders, drawn from their experiences funding other fields. Moving forward, it is critical to determine the best strategies to leverage the strengths of an array of types of new funders in the field.

Number and Role of Funding Intermediaries Growing

As the democracy funding field has grown, the number of pooled funds, regranting organizations, and other intermediaries has also grown, bringing new benefits and challenges. Intermediaries play an increasingly significant role in managing and directing funding to democracy organizations. These vehicles have increased grantmaking convenience, effectiveness, and reporting for funders, and reduced administrative burdens for grantees. They also have served as critical low-barrier entry points for newer field funders. However, some stakeholders have noted that the increased number of intermediaries has caused some unnecessary complexity. At times, this has created difficulties for both newer and more legacy funders in navigating available options.

Growth in the number and scale of intermediaries is seen as a direct result of the growth of funding from individual donors, given the role of intermediaries as aggregators of funding across multiple donors as well as providers of confidentiality to the sources of funding. Evidence of the growth of funding intermediaries is largely drawn from publicly available information and reporting. It includes:

  • Donor collaboratives and pooled funds are growing in size and number — In our research, Democracy Fund identified 74 funds and collaboratives for democracy-related work at the national level, half of which (41) launched in the years since 2016. Many of these include both 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) affiliates, making the full list of funds and organizations even larger, without even taking into account the numerous state and regional funds. Pre-existing funds continue to grow as well. For instance, 40 percent of all giving since 2010 from the State Infrastructure Fund ($56 million of $141 million) was raised during the 2020 election run-up. The Fund’s number of donors has also increased dramatically — from five institutional funders and individual donors in 2010 to 13 in 2017 to 41 as of July 2021. While difficult to estimate, it is likely many hundreds of millions of dollars flow through or are organized by these entities.
  • Donor-advised funds have been a major source of funding growth — Of the $917 million that Silicon Valley Community Foundation’s donor-advised funds have distributed to democracy issues since 2011, over $541 million was donated during the 2019–2020 cycle. This aligns with exponential growth in giving to donor-advised funds more broadly — which has more than quintupled over the past decade — including in 2020, when major donor- advised fund sponsor Fidelity Charitable became the top recipient of charitable giving.18
  • Fiscal sponsors are growing in size — The Sixteen Thirty Fund, a major fiscal sponsor, experienced a tenfold increase in expenditures for consulting firm Arabella Advisors’ services from 2014 to 2019, signaling a large increase in the amount of funds flowing through the hub.19
  • Community foundations are increasing their democracy portfolios — Many regional community foundations have more recently focused on funding democracy work — both within their geographies and nationally — as donors have shown increasing interest in these areas. One interviewee described that their community foundation used to have a small grantmaking portfolio on democratic values, but expanded this focus in the wake of the 2016 election to support census work regionally, as well as national democracy organizations. Since then, it has found this work has helped attract new donors.

Intermediary Funder Benefits

Intermediaries function in different ways that may be attractive to potential funders. They serve as important entry points for newer field funders — narrowing and clarifying grantmaking options, making the complex field easier to navigate, and generally acting as a fund manager. Some of the value that intermediaries offer new funders includes, but is not limited to:

  • Economies of scale — intermediaries provide a structure for giving in ways that individual foundations might not be able to pursue on their own. They have the ability to give a large number of small grants to organizations at the state and local level, which might otherwise pose administrative or relationship management difficulties for national foundations or those with small staffs. They also have both the scale and flexibility needed to be effective in rapid response situations. For instance, the Trusted Elections Fund was able to respond to security threats during the 2020 election, and the Fair Representation in Redistricting pooled fund swiftly provided needed support in response to legal and political developments across states during the 2020–2022 redistricting cycle.20
  • Amplified impact — pooling funds can mean that any individual funder can leverage their giving against that of others, amplifying impact while mitigating risk. Individual grantmakers can report to internal stakeholders about the accomplishments of the full fund, showing the role of their funding in helping achieve larger-scale impact. This can be helpful in unlocking even larger grantmaking budgets in the future. It can also enable program officers and directors to take on more risk than they would if they were operating alone, especially in newer democracy topics like electoral reform.
  • Peer learning networks — intermediaries open doors to other funders, grantee organizations, field experts, and scholars, helping create peer networks and learning communities. These can be formal and informal processes of information exchange that newer funders or smaller foundations may not have capacity to manage on their own. This can be a particularly important benefit for newer funders seeking to build connections. These networks also provide infrastructure for identifying trends across funders, enabling intermediaries to create funding vehicles that are responsive to evolving interests.
  • Tailored approaches — intermediaries are able to leverage the terminology, strategy, and approaches that the particular donors they serve feel most comfortable and aligned with. For instance, one interviewee at a funding intermediary explained how, because the vast majority of their fund’s donors are private equity investors, they approach their national coordination efforts like running a private equity or venture capital fund as an “activist investor.” Their team members sit on nonprofit boards, hold weekly check-in and briefing calls, and advise state campaigns and try to coordinate across states — all as strategies that their donors recognize and appreciate.
  • Anonymity — funders who wish to remain unnamed for their philanthropic giving can achieve confidentiality by working with donor-advised funds, fiscal sponsors, community foundations, and other types of intermediaries. This is particularly relevant in the democracy space, where funders and grantees are often subject to threats of political violence and other risks.

Rapid Growth of Intermediaries Raises Perceived Tensions

Even with the long list of benefits that intermediaries offer, stakeholders also have noted concerns that rapid growth in the number and role of pooled funds and other intermediaries can create challenges. These can include:

  • Complexity among intermediaries — while intermediaries are intended to help simplify options for donors, navigating the universe of intermediaries can prove challenging in itself. Some note the proliferation of funding vehicles with overlapping missions and foci can make it difficult especially for newer funders to parse differences and make strategic investment decisions.
  • Perceived tensions with legacy approaches — where intermediaries serve a wave of newer field funders, often with approaches and interests different from those of legacy funders, intermediaries change their approaches to match. And pooled fund staff may have different backgrounds or expertise than other field funders, which may result in conflicting strategy. With the collective amount of funds these intermediaries administer growing significantly, these changes can alter overall field funding approaches, which has made some legacy funders wary.
  • Competition drives misaligned incentives — intermediaries compete for funding from donors, and therefore may be incentivized to develop strategies and approaches that are inherently distinct from and, at times, in tension with those of other funds. This competitive landscape also requires funds to focus on proving impact. Some stakeholders have noted concerns over a growing emphasis on having grantees produce administratively burdensome quantitative impact data.

Broadly, intermediaries play the role of working across and with the heterogeneity of a field with a wide variety of funders. This is a major undertaking, and one that should not be taken lightly. In all, intermediaries present more benefits than concerns; however, they do introduce complexity to the field.

Looking Ahead

Impact, Opportunity, and the Value of Community Building

The constellation of foundations, donors, nonprofits, and grantees focused on the support and promotion of democracy in the U.S. has shifted significantly since 2016. The result is a field that has grown, matured, and become more impactful. The reasons for this dynamic growth are numerous and multifaceted. These include concerns over election interference, the rise of authoritarianism, growing polarization and division, the growing threat of misinformation, disinformation, and the troubling media landscape. Newer support spans that for engagement in the 2020 Census and ensuing redistricting, to election administration and protection efforts in the context of a global pandemic, to deepening efforts aimed at advancing social and racial justice in the wake of COVID-19 and the murder of George Floyd, and more.

For many, this period of transformation has raised significant questions about the future of the pro-democracy philanthropic field. Rapid growth in response to critical events and crises can just as easily be matched by rapid contraction particularly when it is perceived — correctly or incorrectly — that the crisis moment has passed. And early fundraising challenges experienced by grantees for nonpartisan work related to the 2023–2024 election cycle contributes to these concerns, despite our survey showing strong funding trends among institutional philanthropy. Growing pains can also take the form of inefficiencies, redundancies, and unnecessary complexity that can make a field less effective and blunt impact. Consequently, field stakeholders are wary.

Fortunately, stakeholders overwhelmingly share reasons for optimism: more funding and partners overall, a more mature and varied field, a more comprehensive understanding of how to bolster democracy for impact on a range of issues, and several critical recent examples of impact in spite of perceived challenges. Growth has created significant opportunities to expand and deepen important work in a host of areas — universally cited by survey respondents as cause for excitement about the field’s potential.

Only now, several years into this period of transition, can field stakeholders begin to understand the scope and impact of these changes, and to identify how best to capitalize on growth in ways that promote long-term field health, funding sustainability, and increased collective impact. And overwhelmingly, stakeholders agree: We must start with better information about what the field looks like today, and what we can expect for tomorrow. Stakeholders want to understand the diversity of the field, create collaborative environments, consider the sequencing of funding activities, and adopt strategies that reinforce one another. All are eager for more information that can help make sense of this new landscape, including the wealth of new opportunities it holds.

Potential Opportunities for Field Strengthening and Community Building

As the democracy field continues to grow and mature, additional needs have emerged to ensure that efforts to protect and strengthen American democracy are maximally effective. Opportunities include:

  • Community building — several formal initiatives foster community in the democracy space — networks like Democracy Funders Network and the Funders Committee for Civic Participation as well as pooled funds and associated programming. However, funder experiences may vary, and some stakeholders have noted that well-known funders may have a more welcoming experience entering the field than smaller, lesser-known funders. Regardless, there is space to help funders better connect, to strengthen entry points for newer funders, and to build a strong identity for and community of “democracy funders.”
  • Understanding grantee experiences — it will also be critical to engage with grantee organizations to understand their needs and experiences and enable them to better communicate their goals and crystallize their strategies (e.g., short versus long term, offensive versus defensive) to funders. With so much rapid change in the funding landscape, the experience of grantee organizations and their engagement with the funding ecosystem has changed too, and it will be important to understand especially where new pain points exist. After all, funding in this space is in service of the work grantees do.
  • Defining democracy work — though the available field research and array of publicly available funding strategies have grown significantly, further research is still needed to provide more clarity. This could include:
    • Developing a detailed definition of U.S. democracy work that is shared by a broad set of field stakeholders, and that builds on and updates existing typologies
    • Concise mapping of field actors and their foci, with a particular focus on mapping pooled funds and intermediaries, and their distinct purposes to help especially newer funders navigate the landscape
    • Landscape research on individual high-net-worth donors to pro-democracy causes across the ideological spectrum, including their funding and foci as of 2023
    • Landscaping research and communications on the “anti-democracy” space, including foci, major funders, and emerging trends
  • Strengthening coordination — the field’s rapid growth and the need for both short-term, responsive funding strategies (such as ensuring the security of election administrators in 2020) and for long-term planning (such as supporting advocacy to enact ranked-choice voting in a certain number of states over the next decade) requires regular, precise coordination. Democracy organizations and funders could benefit from consistent, well-maintained coordination mechanisms, including coordination tables, convenings, and shared initiatives. More data is needed, but this could include some level of consolidation across pooled funds and grantees — such as ensuring that there is not an excess of pooled funds supporting a particular subfield.
  • Identifying and filling gaps — funders largely agree that there are key subfields of democracy work that are significantly underfunded, namely election administration, combating misinformation and disinformation, and local journalism. Reasons for inadequate funding may vary but include lack of resources for funders or conception of the issue as being part of “democracy funding.” Creating consistent platforms to share information about new efforts and initiatives in these areas, alongside building theories of change (such as Press Forward), can ensure that these sub-issues continue to grow at an appropriate pace.21

Conclusion

This report represents a critical step in providing a more comprehensive understanding of the shifting field of democracy philanthropy in the United States: where it has been, where it may be headed, and how funder perceptions and realities on the ground compare. Yet questions persist, and further research and data collection are no doubt needed. To continue to grow in a way that meets the needs of the field, this moment and beyond, will require that we first develop a better shared understanding of who we are as a community, and how best to grow together — newer funders and legacy funders alike.

Appendix

Methodology

The objectives of this research project were to map and better understand the field of pro-democracy funding. Specifically, this project sought to understand the following aspects of the democracy funding space:

  • The magnitude of the field in terms of total funding per year
  • Historical changes in the size of the field, particularly from 2017–2018 to 2021–2022 and into 2023–2024
  • Expectations around whether current funding trends will continue and emerging trends in the field
  • Trends in the subtopics being funded and areas that are underfunded
  • Funder experiences, particularly those of new funders, in order to better grasp how anchor and legacy funders and existing intermediaries can pave the way for more funders to enter and/or maintain their philanthropic support for a healthy democracy

To achieve these objectives, we relied on a number of sources, including:

  1. Existing literature, including industry publications, field-level reports, journal articles, foundation websites, and media coverage
  2. Responses from surveys the team conducted among foundation leaders, foundations staff, and donor advisors
  3. Self-reported grant data from institutional funders
  4. Interviews with experts, intermediaries, and new funders in the field
  5. Grant data publicly available on Candid
  6. Confidential grant data from survey respondents who opted to share their data

Below, we list the process that the team followed and how these sources played a role in each phase.

Three Caveats to the Findings

  1. Sourcing of grant data: Because there are limited amounts of publicly available grant data for comparison, we placed a strong emphasis on sourcing that information directly from foundations. However, limited data from foundations meant that direct comparisons were more challenging.
  2. Response rates for self-reported data: Response rates to requests for self-reported data were moderate. As only 37 foundations provided an overall topline number for funding and 13 provided grant-level data, our findings may not fully represent trends in the field.
  3. Institutional funders and individual donors: Survey responses are from only institutional funders, not from individual donors. Given that institutional funders are more visible through their online presence, their reputation, and their time in the field, they were more accessible for purposes of this survey research. Individual donors tend to use funding methods that help maintain their anonymity, and they were therefore challenging to fully include in this research, aside from anecdotal data that we sourced through interviews with intermediaries. For this reason, it is possible that the magnitude and growth rate defined in the report are, to some extent, underestimated.

Because of the gaps in the information the team was able to access, the team relied on informed estimates to reach our conclusions about the size of the field and its growth since 2016.

Existing Literature

We identified and reviewed more than 40 articles, reports, and website pages about the pro-democracy field and funding landscape. This process was designed to provide an initial, high-level understanding about perceptions in this space, identify major funders and intermediaries to include in interviews and surveys, and develop hypotheses that guided the rest of this research process. These sources are cited in a later part of the Appendix.

Interviews with the Experts

While conducting the literature review, we sat down with 17 individuals to hear firsthand about their experience in the field. These include foundation leaders and staff, donor advisors, community foundation leaders and staff, and heads of pooled funds. The insights from these conversations helped inform the design of the surveys that were subsequently conducted.

Survey Data

We conducted two different surveys: one to foundation leaders and a separate one to foundation staff. The leaders and the staff surveys were sent to 144 institutional funders. The distribution list included those previously known to Democracy Fund as supporting democracy-related work along with several that are included in the Candid’s database of democracy-related grants.

  • The leaders survey received 53 responses (38 percent response rate)
  • The staff survey received 34 responses (24 percent response rate)
  • Five additional foundations shared topline information via email, rather than completing the full survey; these were treated as survey responses

Many questions did not make answering mandatory, so the number of funders who responded to any individual question varies. For instance, while 70 funders completed some amount of one or more surveys, only 37 of these funders provided data on topline funding amounts for 2021–2022.

Based on anecdotal data and interview responses, nonresponses to the survey were often due to concerns about confidentiality and anonymity, and due to limited staff capacity.

Self-Reported Grant Data from Survey Respondents

The staff survey included a question asking respondents if they would be willing to share raw grant data that we could review more closely and to support more granular analyses. Twelve funders provided internal grant data in this way. This amounted to data on 2,403 grants across 12 funders, totaling $1.1 billion. To describe the breakdown of issues supported, we interpreted the purpose statements provided by the funders who submitted the data and hand-coded grants accordingly. This process is similar to that conducted by Candid staff for data included in Candid’s database; however, we believe the data gathered and coded by our team may be more up-to-date and exhaustive of democracy-related funding from these institutions, given that the funders themselves identified the relevant grants.

Given the small number of funders included in this sample, these grant data were used as a sample to validate findings and provide greater detail where appropriate, rather than as the basis for most findings.

Interviews with Newer Funders, Intermediaries, and Other Stakeholders

We met with 17 field stakeholders, including with newer funders and representatives of key intermediaries. During 45-minute interviews, we asked experts for their answers to the research questions of this report, describing the magnitude of the field, the directionality of the field, where most funding is flowing, where there are funding needs, what the experience of new funders looks like, and the role that intermediaries play in this space. Through this process, we compared the survey research findings to anecdotal evidence shared verbally during interviews, some of which validated the survey findings, and some of which added new information.

Candid Data

Data from Candid filled important gaps in our research where survey data were insufficient to answer the research questions. We accessed data on Candid on various occasions for various uses, for example:

  • To identify a broad list of funders in the democracy space that helped shape the list of institutional funders to receive the survey
  • To identify the potential size of funding in the field that was then adjusted with the error rate
  • To assess how the Candid data compared to self-reported foundation data in 2017–2018 and 2021–2022 for the purposes of understanding potential differences in how these datasets measure funding and develop a potentially more accurate picture of field funding

Defining the Field

Democracy Fund worked with internal experts to develop a taxonomy of democracy-related funding for use in our survey. To do this, we first assessed current taxonomies, including that developed by Candid in 2015, which remains the most widely used and cited. We then developed potential updates to these definitions to better match our understanding of current field foci — with the goal of developing categories and groupings that would make intuitive sense to survey respondents, while maintaining comparability with Candid data and categories where possible. We then discussed these categories with several leading funders to further hone the definitions and groupings. The resulting taxonomy, which was provided to survey respondents, is below.

These definitions are intended to encompass different types of work within each area — including action-focused initiatives on the ground, organizing and advocacy efforts, and academic and research-focused work.

Voting and Elections

  • Voting Rights: Supporting efforts to influence access, ability, and requirements to vote, including work on voting rights and voter ID requirements, and combating voter suppression efforts.
  • Voter Education and Engagement: Supporting efforts to inform and engage voters or mobilize voters to register to vote or participate in elections.
  • Election Administration: Supporting administration, policy, and/or reform efforts addressing voting systems and technologies; encouraging recruitment and training of a new generation of poll workers; and efforts to prevent election subversion.
  • Campaign Finance: Supporting research and/or reform efforts related to the financing of campaigns.
  • Redistricting: Supporting efforts to study and/or reform the redistricting process, including litigation.

Inclusion, Equity, and Justice

  • Social and Racial Justice: Supporting efforts to create a multiracial, inclusive democracy; combat structural racism; enable movement, power-building, and leadership development in historically marginalized communities, particularly communities of color; and support social justice efforts more broadly.
  • Social Cohesion and Polarization: Supporting efforts to create a shared sense of identity and purpose, promoting conversations around important issues within and/or across communities, and combating polarization.
  • Political Violence and Anti-Hate: Supporting efforts to prevent or mitigate political violence by addressing extremism and hate, promoting community resilience, and responding to trauma (individual and collective).

Civic Education and Participation

  • Civic Education and Leadership: Supporting non-election-related efforts to educate youth and the public about civic issues including the political process and governing institutions, as well as promoting diverse leadership development in public and civic life and capacity building for community leaders.
  • Public and Issue-Based Participation: Supporting non-election-related organizing, engagement, volunteerism, action around the policymaking process, naturalization efforts among legal permanent residents, or community life broadly or around specific issue areas or with specific constituencies.
  • Census: Supporting efforts to ensure a full and accurate census count, including policy and Get-Out-the-Count activities, and a timely and comprehensive release of the data.

Government Effectiveness and Democracy Protection

  • Civil Rights/Liberties and Rule of Law: Supporting work around the protection of civil rights and liberties and individual rights embodied in the Constitution, as well as efforts to uphold the rule of law.
  • Government Oversight and Reform: Supporting efforts to research and/or reform the government, and to improve performance and transparency overall and within each branch of government, including around budgeting and fiscal systems at all levels of government, and the courts.

Media and Information Ecosystem

  • Journalism: Supporting a broad range of efforts to promote a healthy journalism ecosystem and support local journalism, including efforts to educate and train journalists, support for news programs, investigative journalism, and documentary media, and efforts to expand tools and resources available to and used by journalists.
  • Media Policy and Mis/Disinformation: Supporting efforts related to media access, including work around media literacy and media justice, efforts to implement and/or reform media information policies such as related to freedom of expression and intellectual property, and efforts to track and combat mis- and disinformation.

General/Non-Issue Specific:

Supporting multi-issue or multidisciplinary efforts or organizations through general operating funds not tied to specific sub-issues.

Other Issues:

Supporting democracy-related activities in specific issue areas not included in other categories.

Estimating the Magnitude of the Field

To arrive at this report’s estimates for the size of the full field (based on the sample of funders included in Candid’s database for 2017–2018), we took the following steps:

  1. Understand Candid’s rate of undercounting — we compared the 2017–2018 self-reported funding levels from the confidential sample of 12 foundations for which data were available on background. This analysis showed that Candid data undercounted funding levels for these foundations by 34 percent on average.
  2. Adjust Candid data based on undercounting rate — we then collected all Candid data for 2017–2018 and adjusted these data using the 34 percent error rate to estimate a revised total funding level for 2017–2018.
  3. Estimate the size of the field in 2017–2018 — we combined these two datasets, using confidential internal data for foundations where available (assumed to be accurate) and adjusted Candid data for those where self-reported data were not available, to develop a full field magnitude in 2017–2018 of $5.2 billion.
  4. Estimate the growth rate from 2017–2018 to 2021–2022 — we compared real and estimated totals for 2017–2018 with self-reported funding totals for 2021–2022 provided by survey respondents (n = 37), to develop an estimated in-sample growth rate of 56 percent.
  5. Estimate the size of the field in 2021–2022 — assuming the growth rate was consistent across all funders included in Candid’s data for 2017–2018 (n = 9,144), we then applied that growth rate to the adjusted 2017–2018 data to develop an estimated total for 2021–2022 of $8.1 billion. We divided this number by two to approximate the annual size of the field at $4.1 billion (note: these numbers may not add due to rounding).

The methodology described above relies heavily on projections and estimates based on data from several years prior, given the limitations of comparable data from 2021–2022. As an alternative to this methodology, our team attempted to use data from Candid’s broader database as a proxy for data that appears missing from the dedicated democracy-related database. This included the following steps and findings:

  1. Understand the rate of undercounting from Candid’s broader database — we first compared self-reported funding totals drawn from our survey with “Democracy” and “Voter Rights” data for the same foundations from Candid’s broader database for 2021–2022. We found the Candid data in these categories undercounted funding among these institutions by about 39 percent — or rather than these categories are expected to only account for about 61 percent of all funding (for instance due to not including all relevant categories).
  2. Adjust Candid data based on undercounting rate — if we assume that rate to be consistent across all institutions with 2021–2022 funding for “Democracy” and “Voter Rights” in Candid’s database, that would yield an estimate of $5.7 billion in total field funding for 2021–2022. If instead we assume the Candid data captures 81 percent of true funding — half the difference as what was identified — that would yield an estimate of $4.7 billion in total field funding for 2021–2022.

Due to significant and opaque differences in categorization between the “Democracy” and “Voter Rights” categories and the broader and more tailored set of issues measured in our survey and in Candid’s dedicated democracy-related database, we chose not to include these estimates in our main report.

Citations from the Literature Review

The research team scraped the websites of six philanthropy and nonprofit sector publications and nine general news publications, as well as the websites of the 14 members of the Democracy Funders Collaborative. The team focused on materials relevant to funding for U.S. democracy, primarily within the last five years (since 2018). The sites and publications that the team searched are:

Philanthropy Sector Publications and Sites

  • Inside Philanthropy
  • The Chronicle of Philanthropy
  • Stanford Social Innovation Review (SSIR)
  • Nonprofit Quarterly
  • The Bridgespan Group
  • Websites of Democracy Funder Collaborative members
  • Scholars Strategy Network

General Publication Sites

  • The New York Times
  • The Washington Post
  • Politico
  • Vox
  • The Atlantic
  • The Economist
  • The Wall Street Journal
  • Insider
  • The New Yorker

Below is a list of the publicly available sources of 40+ articles, reports, and webpages used in the report literature review:

 

Article Title Publication/Source Date
Article Title

We the People: A Philanthropic Guide for Strengthening Democracy

Publication/Source

Democracy Fund and the Center for High-Impact Philanthropy at the University of Pennsylvania

Date

2019

Article Title

Democracy-Focused Philanthropy: Choosing Operating Models for Deeper Impact

Publication/Source

Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors

Date

December 2022

Article Title

Our Divided Nation: Is There a Role for Philanthropy in Renewing Democracy?

Publication/Source

Kettering Foundation/Council on Foundations

Date

2019

Article Title

Democracy & Philanthropy: The Rockefeller Foundation and the American Experiment

Publication/Source

The Rockefeller Foundation

Date

2013

Article Title

The Roadmap for Local News: An Emergent Approach to Meeting Civic Information Needs

Publication/Source

MacArthur Foundation

Date

February 2023

Article Title

Slow and Steady Wins the Race: Ten Years of the State Infrastructure Fund

Publication/Source

State Infrastructure Fund

Date

July 2021

Article Title

Philanthropy to Protect US Democracy

Publication/Source

Stanford Social Innovation Review

Date

October 2022

Article Title

Voter Engagement Toolkit for Private Foundations

Publication/Source

Council on Foundations

Date

April 2018

Article Title

Foundations, It’s Time to Give 1% of Your Assets to Fix Democracy

Publication/Source

The Chronicle of Philanthropy

Date

December 2019

Article Title

Achieving Justice for All Should Command Philanthropy’s Attention in 2020 Elections

Publication/Source

The Chronicle of Philanthropy

Date

December 2019

Article Title

Democracy and Civic Life: What Is the Long Game for Philanthropy?

Publication/Source

Knight Foundation

Date

November 2020

Article Title

General Operating Proposal

Publication/Source

Protect Democracy

Date

June 2022

Article Title

On Democracy and Authoritarianism

Publication/Source

Protect Democracy

Date

No Date

Article Title

Donors Worry About a Cash Crunch for Voter Registration Groups

Publication/Source

The New York Times

Date

September 2022

Article Title

This Group Has $100 Million and a Big Goal: To Fix America

Publication/Source

The New York Times

Date

November 2022

Article Title

U-Va. is investing $100 million in saving democracy. Can it make a difference?

Publication/Source

The Washington Post

Date

June 2021

Article Title

Philanthropy Needs New Strategies to Save American Democracy

Publication/Source

Inside Philanthropy

Date

October 2022

Article Title

Democracy Frontlines Fund Realizes Transformative Philanthropy for Racial Justice

Publication/Source

Stanford Social Innovation Review (SSIR)

Date

Fall 2021

Article Title

Foundations Focus Their Attentions on Saving Democracy

Publication/Source

The Chronicle of Philanthropy

Date

January 2021

Article Title

Philanthropy Can Help Build a Thriving Democracy by Building Up Programs and Places That Fuel Civic Involvement

Publication/Source

The Chronicle of Philanthropy

Date

January 2022

Article Title

Can Philanthropy Save Democracy?

Publication/Source

The Chronicle of Philanthropy

Date

October 2019

Article Title

Foundations, the Solution to Our Democracy Deficit Lies in Plain Sight

Publication/Source

The Chronicle of Philanthropy

Date

May 2021

Article Title

To Protect Democracy, Funders Must Look to the States

Publication/Source

Inside Philanthropy

Date

March 2021

Article Title

Democracy Funders Are Forgetting About One of the Biggest Threats to Democracy

Publication/Source

Inside Philanthropy

Date

February 2022

Article Title

The Emerging Field of Political Innovation

Publication/Source

Stanford Social Innovation Review (SSIR)

Date

Spring 2023

Article Title

How Can Philanthropy Help Rehabilitate US Democracy?

Publication/Source

Stanford Social Innovation Review (SSIR)

Date

January 2021

Article Title

Democrats ‘Charity’ Voter-Registration Scheme

Publication/Source

The Wall Street Journal

Date

September 2022

Article Title

Mark Zuckerberg has donated $300 million to protect democracy despite Facebook’s record

Publication/Source

Vox

Date

September 2020

Article Title

Inside Mind the Gap, the secretive Silicon Valley group that has funneled over $20 million to Democrats

Publication/Source

Vox

Date

January 2020

Article Title

A new generation of philanthropists are ticked off at Trump — and their parents

Publication/Source

Vox

Date

January 2020

Article Title

Publishing C.E.O. Donates $500,000 to Fight Book Bans

Publication/Source

The New York Times

Date

February 2022

Article Title

The most powerful network of Democratic donors has a new president

Publication/Source

Politico

Date

September 2021

Article Title

Dems fear for democracy. Their big donors aren’t funding one of its main election groups

Publication/Source

Politico

Date

February 2022

Article Title

Philanthropy’s Agenda for Rebuilding Our Democracy

Publication/Source

The Chronicle of Philanthropy

Date

November 2020

Article Title

Philanthropy’s Stimulus Plan Must Bolster Democracy

Publication/Source

The Chronicle of Philanthropy

Date

April 2020

Article Title

Everything Philanthropy Cares About Depends on a Strong Democracy. Here’s What We Can Do to Stop the Deterioration

Publication/Source

The Chronicle of Philanthropy

Date

October 2019

Article Title

116 Organizations Driving Change

Publication/Source

Medium

Date

July 2020

Article Title

Civic Engagement Grants

Publication/Source

Inside Philanthropy

Date

No Date

 

Overview of Survey Respondents

Funders who responded to the survey(s) reported annual democracy grantmaking budgets ranging from $902,000 per year to over $610 million annually and included both newer (less than five years in the field) and older (more than five years in the field) funders. The vast majority of respondents had funded democracy issues continuously for more than five years, and a plurality of respondents provided over $20 million in grants to democracy issues in 2021 2022.

Funders by 2021–2022 501(C)(3) Grantmaking Total
2021–2022 501(c)(3) Grantmaking Total Number of Funders in the Survey Sample Within Range Total Dollar Amount Given by Funders in this Category
2021–2022 501(c)(3) Grantmaking Total

$50 million

Number of Funders in the Survey Sample Within Range

8

Total Dollar Amount Given by Funders in this Category

$1,269,966,482

2021–2022 501(c)(3) Grantmaking Total

$20 million to $50 million

Number of Funders in the Survey Sample Within Range

8

Total Dollar Amount Given by Funders in this Category

$229,516,645

2021–2022 501(c)(3) Grantmaking Total

$10 million to $20 million

Number of Funders in the Survey Sample Within Range

8

Total Dollar Amount Given by Funders in this Category

$125,834,500

2021–2022 501(c)(3) Grantmaking Total

$5 million to $10 million

Number of Funders in the Survey Sample Within Range

5

Total Dollar Amount Given by Funders in this Category

$40,767,500

2021–2022 501(c)(3) Grantmaking Total

$5 million

Number of Funders in the Survey Sample Within Range

8

Total Dollar Amount Given by Funders in this Category

$16,837,000

  1. Any information included in this report which mentions an institution by name is drawn from publicly available sources and is not related to survey or interview. An overview of the literature review conducted is available in the Appendix. []
  2. Authors used two-year periods to account for cyclicality across years and compared 2017–2018 and 2021–2022 given data availability and to align with comparable off- year U.S. election cycles. []
  3. In 2013, eight institutional foundations, including Democracy Fund, provided seed funding to the Foundation Center, now Candid, to develop the Foundation Funding for U.S. Democracy platform. These foundations also served on an advisory group to inform Candid’s framework for democracy-related issue areas. []
  4. In total, 70 funders provided qualitative or quantitative data for this report, though not all provided responses for all Of these, 37 funders provided data on funding totals for 2021–2022. This report leverages insights from all data collected, and samples for some insights will be larger or smaller than for others. []
  5. While these categories do not overlap perfectly with those used in the Candid’s dedicated democracy-related database, the vast difference suggests a large amount of funding data that has yet to be included. []
  6. As an alternative measure, our team attempted to align funding from Candid’s broader database with funding identified through our survey. When combining funding identified in our survey with that included in Candid’s broader database under the “Democracy” and “Voter Rights” categories, we find total known funding to be $4.1 billion. We chose to exclude this datapoint from the main report given differences in issue categories and definitions across sources. []
  7. Numbers may not add due to rounding. This estimate accounts only for funders with data available in Candid for 2017–2018 and does not account for any funders that were included in other years, for instance funders that more recently entered the field. The estimated 61 percent growth rate includes some funders that, according to Candid data, didn’t fund related work at all in 2017– 2018. If we remove these funders from the sample because, for instance, we think that the 2017–2018 data for these institutions should be higher than $0, the estimated growth rate would be 56 percent. When applied to the full sample, this would yield an estimated funding total of $6.7 billion in 2021–2022, as opposed to $6.9 billion. []
  8. To offer an alternative methodology for estimating the size of the field, we conducted a parallel analysis using data from the “Democracy” and “Voter Rights” categories of Candid’s broader funding database. This yielded a range of $4.7 billion to $5.7 billion in field funding in 2021–2022. Details and results of this analysis can be found in the Appendix. We chose not to include these estimates in the main report given differences in issue categories and definitions across sources. []
  9. “Giving USA: Total U.S. charitable giving declined in 2022 to $499.33 billion following two years of record generosity,” IUPUI School of Philanthropy, June 20, 2023, accessed August 29, 2023. Available at: https://philanthropy.iupui.edu/news-events/news- item/giving-usa:-total-u.s.-charitable-giving-declined-in-2022-to-%24499.33-billion-following-two-years-of-record-generosity. html?id=422#:~:text=Key%20findings%20from%20Giving%20USA,to%20U.S.%20charities%20in%202022. []
  10. Only five survey respondents shared 501(c)(4) funding figures for 2021–2022, totaling just $211 million. These data were not included in funding estimates, given the small sample size and lack of clarity on accuracy of inclusion of 501(c)(4) data in Candid. If, however, these survey data were included in these calculations — on assumption that Candid data for 2017–2018 appropriately accounts for 501(c)(4) funding — estimated in-sample growth between 2017–2018 and 2021–2022 would increase to 81 percent, rather than 61 percent. Estimated total field funding for 2021–2022 would increase to $7.8 billion, rather than $6.9 billion. []
  11. Cheryl Dorsey, Peter Kim, Cora Daniels, Lyell Sakaue, and Britt Savage, “Overcoming the Racial Bias in Philanthropic Funding,” Stanford Social Innovation Review, May 2020, accessed August Available at: https://doi.org/10.48558/7WB9-K440. []
  12. See Bolder Advocacy’s website for more information on the similarities and differences between 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4 []
  13. Remaining respondent indicated they do not know if their organization has an affiliated 501(c)(4) funding organization. []
  14. To review Candid’s original issue taxonomy and definitions, click on the small Definitions link under the Subject Areas line on Candid’s democracy data tool page. []
  15. Theodore Schleifer, “A new generation of philanthropists are ticked off at Trump — and their parents,” Vox, January 2020, accessed August 2023. Available at: https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/1/13/20827389/young-donors-philanthropists-resource-generation- politics-trump. []
  16. Karen Tumulty, “U-Va. is investing $100 million in saving democracy. Can it make a difference?,” The Washington Post, June 2021, accessed August 2023. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/06/03/uva-is-investing-100-million-saving- democracy-can-it-make-difference/. []
  17. See Way to Rise website for more []
  18. Chuck Collins and Helen Flannery, “The Rise of Monster DAFs,” Institute for Policy Studies, August 2022, accessed August 2023. Available at: https://ips-dc.org/the-rise-of-the-monster-dafs. []
  19. “Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (Form 990),” Sixteen Thirty Fund, 2014–2019, accessed September 2023. []
  20. Find more information on Trusted Elections Fund and Fair Representation in Redistricting. []
  21. Elizabeth Green, Darryl Holliday, and Mike Rispoli, “The Roadmap for Local News: An Emergent Approach to Meeting Civic Information Needs,” MacArthur Foundation, February 2022, accessed August 2023. Available at: https://localnewsroadmap.org/ wp-content/uploads/2023/02/The-Roadmap-for-Local-News-Feb-2-23.pdf. []
Blog

There’s a Crack in the Foundation

/
June 18, 2021

As the United States continues to reckon with the crack in its foundation, the legacy of slavery, our institutions are making small steps to finally recognize Juneteenth commemorating the day enslaved Black people in Galveston, Texas learned of their freedom on June 19, 1865.

Yesterday, the president signed historic legislation to establish Juneteenth as a U.S. federal holiday. While the action signals a step forward as a nation, it is also a stark reminder of how far our country still has to go. Just as the journey to a perfect union doesn’t end with one verdict, a national holiday does not absolve the nation of its relationship with white supremacy.

Six months after the first Black and South Asian woman was confirmed as vice president of the United States, the right to vote remains threatened, and yet Black people are still called on to fight for democratic institutions that often don’t protect us — a bitter irony when we are historically our democracy’s strongest champions.

To be clear: symbolism is important. National recognition of Juneteenth and the celebration of its significance provide the chance to learn and discuss these difficult truths about our shared past. This weekend should absolutely be filled with events that celebrate Black culture and shout out to that extra day off! 

But imagine a world where the symbolism of a national holiday is coupled with equitable rights and a clear pro-democracy agenda. Imagine it, and use the image it conjures as motivation in the ongoing journey towards achieving that reality. Let’s call out policies that claim to secure elections but are designed to prevent Black people from making their voices heard. Let’s create and implement new reforms that foster diversity, equity, and inclusion — ones that build power and bring about racial and economic justice. 

And as my dear friend LaTasha Brown of Black Voters Matter said, “This isn’t just a policy fight. We are fighting a culture of oppression.” We cannot take our foot off the gas. Instead, despite everything, we must double down. 

Our democracy remains at risk until we fully reckon with the forces of systemic racism that boldly try to suppress Black voter participation while masking it with performative actions. We must stop the efforts to disenfranchise Black people or we will never achieve a healthy, open and just democracy. My grandmother often said, “baby. don’t get weary in well-doing.” These words resonate with this moment, and serve as a reminder that now is not the time to let weariness overcome the drive of good work. 

America, there’s a crack in our foundation. Are we ready to rebuild? 

Blog
Featured

A Call for the Pro-Democracy Field to Prepare for Gray Rhinos

Joe Goldman and Crystal Hayling
/
June 6, 2024

Admitting that you’re planning for the worst-case scenario when it comes to democracy can be tough. It takes courage not to brush aside threats of violence. It is hard to acknowledge that our political systems might fail or that forces are actively working to undermine our election system.

As Democracy Fund’s new paper, On Black Swans, Gray Rhinos, and the 2024 Election outlines, understanding the menagerie of “chaos factors” in front of us may hold the secret to readying the pro-democracy field to meet this moment.

Too often, “Black Swans,” or unpredictable disasters, distract our attention in these conversations. At Democracy Fund, we are more focused on “Gray Rhinos” — the foreseeable dangers that we fail to prepare for, even though they are charging straight at us in plain sight.

What makes a Gray Rhino foreseeable and a Black Swan nearly impossible to predict? The difference is often in what holds our attention. And navigating the chaos factors ahead will come down to listening, readiness, and resilience.

Listen to Marginalized Communities Sounding the Alarm

By the time the rumbling earth caused by a charging rhino is close enough to feel, most responses are ineffectual: fear, hope that the carnage will happen to someone else but not us, doubt that we can do anything to stop it, and of course, the desire to just run and hide. There’s no escaping disaster when a Gray Rhino is on our heels.

However, there are ways to prepare for Gray Rhino threats. One of the best ways to prepare is to listen to marginalized communities, who are often the first lines of both defense and impact. Their perspectives are invaluable because they are often the first to be targeted and tend to have the greatest perspective on the real scope of the dangers we face.

Too often, however, the people closest to the harms aren’t at decision-making tables — their valid concerns and forewarnings are cast aside by people in positions of safety and power.

Take for example, the conservative court’s intention to overturn Roe v. Wade as a Gray Rhino. Despite the clear and stated threat, along with the warnings of reproductive justice advocates and BIPOC organizers, many people were not able to imagine or prepare for the court taking this action. The Rhino was charging straight ahead, but too many hoped that it would ultimately divert its path. People who had already directly experienced their rights being taken away were in a better position to realize the threat and know how to organize against it. But with so many ignoring their warnings, we were largely unprepared when the Dobbs v. Jackson ruling finally came down in the summer of 2022.

Political violence may be the next Gray Rhino that will cross our path. Communities that have been under the threat of state-sanctioned violence are keenly tuned into the warning signs of authoritarianism and anti-democratic actors. All the warning signs in our election environment are there, including an alarming rise in threats against front-line leaders, election administrators, and public officials. Movement leaders are raising the alarm and lives are at stake should we continue to ignore their warnings. We need to not only prepare for this very real threat but protect the organizers and communities that are most directly in the path of this Gray Rhino.

Invest in Readiness by Taking Cues from Communities

Listening to marginalized communities doesn’t just help us identify threats. It also provides insights into effective solutions.

The signs and effects of most threats are felt first at a local level, which is also where the groundwork for solutions is often laid. As funders, we must look to local organizers and community-based solutions to understand what is most needed and likely to be the most effective. These efforts often embody the resilience we need — flexible, adaptive, and community-centered, rather than brittle and dependent on external forces.

For example, during COVID-19, mutual aid networks emerged to provide essential support where top-down responses fell short. Similarly, research shows that social connection and cohesion directly aid a community’s ability to recover from natural disasters and public health crises. Communities with a deep sense of connection that adopt a sustained, shared response to threats are more resilient than those relying on temporary, external interventions.

As grantmakers, we can fuel what works. For example, the Trusted Elections Fund has invested in state-based networks to prepare for the dual threats of election sabotage and political violence. And organizations like the Center for Tech and Civic Life are ensuring that under-funded local election offices have the resources they need to carry out a well-run election.

Just as the fields of natural disaster and public health response have developed coordinated strategies, pro-democracy philanthropy can apply this same resilience-planning mindset to prepare for future threats.

Resilience in the Face of Charging Rhinos

Planning for resilience requires us to look clear-eyed at Gray Rhinos and listen intentionally to people who know the signs before they begin to charge. We must listen to those who can see chaos factors on the horizon. With senses heightened to these threats, we may begin to realize that what looks like chaos is complexity. And where chaos can cause us to lose hope, complexity is something we can tackle together.

This preparation involves asking crucial questions: Who are we bringing to the scenario planning table? Whose voices are we listening to and prioritizing? What strengths and solutions already exist at the local level that we can further support?

The more that the grantmaking community can invest in planning and the more we shift resources to community-led efforts, the stronger the pro-democracy field will be. Together, we can weather what is ahead by investing in resilience, engaging in shared preparedness, and building trusted relationships with people who can identify these threats.

Blog
Featured

Democracy Fund Invests $23 Million to Ensure Our Elections Are Free, Fair, and Representative

May 29, 2024

Philanthropy’s typical “wait and see” approach has proven to be too little, too late for fast-moving election cycles. With primary elections underway, the pro-democracy organizations working to protect free, fair and representative elections need support now to prepare and execute planned strategies.

In February, Democracy Fund worked with dozens of other philanthropies to launch the nonpartisan 501(c)3 All by April pledge. Nearly 200 foundations, individual donors, philanthropic advisors, and pooled funds signed on, agreeing to commit funds earlier and move them sooner than we have in the past.

Democracy Fund has fulfilled our All by April commitment by:

  • Expediting the distribution of $23 million by the end of April in election-focused grants for this election cycle. This includes new grants awarded in 2023 and 2024 and early distribution of committed 2024 funding for multi-year grantees.
  • Streamlining grant processes as much as possible, particularly for renewal grants.
  • Providing as many general support grants as possible so grantees can be responsive to evolving opportunities and threats to free and fair elections.

“Year after year, pro-democracy field organizations tell us that money from philanthropy arrived too late to be used effectively and efficiently. We took action on that learning this year by rallying the field through All by April. Getting unrestricted dollars to grantees faster means they are better able to plan, hire, and train staff and build the networks needed for this election cycle and beyond. All by April is proof of the positive impact philanthropy can have when we join together and listen to what our grantees tell us they need.” – Joe Goldman, president, Democracy Fund

Philanthropy Should Move at the Speed of Grantees

The grantees we support work year-round to ensure our elections are free, fair, and representative.

“For organizations like New Georgia Project whose work is critical every year, not just in election years — early and ongoing investment is not only needed, but essential. We already have to contend with the boom-and-bust cycle of funding that follows major election years, and having resources to start the year allows us to have an impact immediately and plan for the future. Because of early investment in 2024, we have already helped more than 13,000 Georgians register to vote, knocked on more than 84,000 doors, and talked to thousands of Georgians about voting this year. We build power year over year and knowing early that we have resources to support our work gives us the stability we need to have the greatest impact we can have.” – Kendra Cotton, CEO, New Georgia Project

The organizations receiving expedited and additional support as a result of the All by April campaign are the cornerstone of our democracy. Whether they are fighting to reduce barriers to voting, combating misinformation, recruiting poll workers, or protecting voters and election administrators — these nonpartisan groups help connect voters to the ballot and promote a more equitable democracy. They need fast, consistent, and flexible dollars to do their best work.

“Philanthropic funding is critical to the success of election protection, GOTV, and other strategies to advance free and fair elections and protect our democracy. Unfortunately, this funding often comes too late to meet local needs. That’s why we were thrilled to learn about the All by April campaign led by Democracy Fund. This effort has raised awareness of the need for speed in democracy funding for the sector and helped us to achieve our fundraising goals for Public Rights Project’s Election Protection Hub.” — Jill Habig, founder and CEO, Public Rights Project

The need for free, fair, and representative elections won’t stop after this year. Pro-democracy field organizations will continue to work tirelessly to protect free, fair, and representative elections, and philanthropy has a responsibility to modernize our grantmaking approach for the long-term. Early funding provides strong benefits to grantees and the positive impact on our democracy is clear.

“Getting ahead of the election cycle with time to plan is critical to our success in the big presidential election years. We’ve had an early renewal that provided both early and extra funding to help make sure voters have useful, well-designed information and tools that invite them to participate in our democracy.” — Whitney Quesenbery, director, Center for Civic Design

How Democracy Fund Drives Support for Elections & Voting

To guide our grantmaking, we will continue to deepen our conversations with grant recipients and their communities. In addition to this year’s All by April grants, we are committed to investing in:

  • Grassroots organizations that are working to build power in their communities.
  • Support for our election systems and administrators.
  • Structural changes to equalize voters’ power and address the fairness and legitimacy of the election system.

We will continue to invite peer funders to help us create a stronger pro-democracy field that values and protects everyone’s right to an election system that consistently produces trusted results, fairly represents the will of the majority of voters, and reflects equitable participation — especially among communities of color. Together, we can improve our philanthropic practices to better support the building of an inclusive, multiracial democracy.

*Please Note: Democracy Fund does not accept unsolicited business plans, proposals, or personal requests. For general inquiries, contact info@democracyfund.org. Check out our website to learn more about our work and our grantees.

Democracy Fund
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Washington, DC 20036